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PROVINCIAL COUNCILS: A POLITICAL APPROACH 
A Case Study of Central Province 
Introduction 
ln September 1987 the Sri Lankan government passed a Bill to establish Provincial Councils 
(PCs) for the nine provinces of Sri Lanka. Elections were held for these councils on a 
staggered basis. The establishment of these councils and getting them off the ground faced 
man y problems due to the prevailing situation in the country. On one sida the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party - SLFP, which is the major opposition party opposed the establishment of 
the Provincial Councils and boycotted the elections. They were joined by the Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna - JVP who took a Sinhala extremist position and opposed any form of 
regional autonomy and concessions to the minorities on ideological grounds. Not only did 
they oppose the establishment of PCs, but they also carried out a systematic violent 
campaign to prevent people from contesting and voting in the Provincial Council elections. 
The Presidential elections held in December 1988 also made the position of the Provincial 
Councils very uncertain. There was very much the possibility of a victory of the SLFP 
candidate in the elections. Her platform was to dissolve the Provincial Councils and to 
replace it with another framework. The dissolution of the Councils would have reverted the 
situation back to square one. Although the SLFP candidate also proposed a form of regional 
autonomy as their solution to the ethnie problem, it was not certain how much importance 
could be given to these proposais. The political base of the SLFP is such that it is extremely 
unlikely that they would have gone along with their solution if there was opposition from 
their Sinhala political constituency. 
ln Sri Lanka the attempts at devolution were always controversial and had led to political 
tensions due to the ethnie dimensions accompanying it. Two former Prime Ministers of Sri 
Lanka representing both political parties that have ruled the country since independence, had 
to give up proposais for regional autonomy and devolution of power because of the 
opposition from the Sinhala majority in the South. Among the Sinhalese any form of regional 
autonomy has been equated with 'separation' or 'dividing' the country. The political power 
of this opinion is such that it was extremely difficult to imagine a government in Colombo 
agreeing to a scheme of devolution on its own. ln the past such ideas were given up as 
soon as the opposition among the Sinhalese manifested itself. Therefore the lndian 
intervention and lndo-Sri Lanka Accord had been a crucial factor for the emergence of this 
devolution package. ln fact the Accord with lndia is the only document signed by a head of 
state in Sri Lanka accepting the multiethnic character of the country and the fact that certain 
areas of the country are identified with particular ethnie groups. This formed the basis on 
which the scheme for devolution was proposed. ln other words the external factors played 
a crucial role in bringing about devolution in Sri Lanka. 
Despite these problems it seems that Sri Lanka does not have any way out of the ethnie 
conflict other than through soma form of regional autonomy. Regional autonomy seem to 
be the inevitable outcome at this historical juncture. Even in the case of the SLFP. although 
they have gone back on the manifeste that they proposed during the Presidential elections, 
they seem to corne back to the same basic position. ln the new manifeste that the SLFP 
issued for the general election they have gone back to the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam 
Pact, which also envisaged a form of regional autonomy. This makes the JVP in the South 
the only major political formation opposing this historical trend. 
As a result of these uncertainties generated by political processes the Provincial Councils did 
not really get off the ground until the results of the Presidential election and the general 
election was clear. The former was held in December 1988 and the latter in February 1989. 
The victory of the UNP in both these elections took away the fears about dissolution of the 
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whole system. lt was only after these elections that the Provincial Councils began to be 
active. However even now the Provincial Councils are in the process of being formed. This 
status affects any study of the Provincial Councils undertaken at this stage. 
This report is the first part of a two part report devoted to the study of policy issues in 
education based on the exemple of the Central Province. The main objective of this study 
is to look at the possible policy issues in a specific area that the Provincial Councils will face 
keeping in mind ethnie politics which actually brought about the whole system of devolution. 
The specific area chosen for the study is education because of its political sensitivity. Being 
an important avenue for social mobility education is a very sensitive area for ethnie politics. 
Therefore it gives greater scope for looking at the policy issues of the Provincial Council 
system, keeping politics at the centre of analysis. 
This analysis is also confined to a specific geographical area - namely the Central Province. 
The Central Province is multiethnic. This Province has the highest concentration of lndian 
Tamils found anywhere in the island. lt also has the plantation industry which is still crucial 
for Sri lanka's economy. Finally it is also an area where state intervention in education is 
needed. Ali these make the Central Province a relevant and an interesting geographical 
location to be focused upon. 
The first part of the study which follows is entirely devoted to an analysis of political 
aspects of the devolutionary process that affect the Central Province. This forms the 
backdrop for the more specific discussion on education which will follow in the second 
report. 
Part 1- Theoretical issues 
The Administrative approach 
Analysis of various devolutionary exercises from an administrative perspective can be 
identified as a dominant tradition. Basically this analysis concentrate on administrative 
structures introduced in the exercise of devolution and evaluate their effectiveness in terms 
of the objectives envisaged by these policies. This perspective has been adopted in many 
studies carried out both internationally ( 1) and nationally (2). 
ln this approach the term 'decentralisation' is given a very wide meaning. For example 
reviewing decentralisation experiences in developing countries (3) identified four types of 
'decentralisation. These are deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization. These 
four types include various types of attempts having the objective of reducing the power of 
the central government. "Deconcentration is the handing over of some amount of 
administrative responsibility to lower levels within central government ministries and 
agencies." ...... "Delegation transfers managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions 
to organisations that are outside the regular bureaucratie structure and that are only 
indirectly controlled by the central government." .... "Devolution is the creation or 
strenghthening - financially or legally - of subnational units of government, the activities of 
which are substantially outside the direct control of the central government." .... and "Sorne 
governments have divested themselves of responsibility for functions and have either 
transferred them to voluntary organisations or allowed them to be performed by private 
enterprises." This is privatisation. 
After defining 'decentralisation' to include all these diverse processes, the next task of this 
analysis is to look at the effectiveness of the structures that had been introduced as a result 
of these policy changes in achieving policy objectives and to identify the 'factors' that 
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influence the success and the failure of the 'decentralisation' exercise. "ln general 
assessments of decentralisation in developing countries suggest that four main factors affect 
the success or failure of these :(a) the degree to which central political leaders and 
bureaucracies support decentralisation and the organisations to which responsibilities are 
transferred; (b) the degree to which the dominant behaviour, attitudes and culture are 
conducive to decentralised decision making and administration; (c) the degree to which 
policies and programmes are appropriately designed and organised to promote decentralised 
decision making and management; and (d) the degree to which adequate financial, human, 
and physical rssources are made available to the organizations to which responsibilities are 
transfered. (4). 
Similarly in the case of Sri Lanka, applying the same theoretical approach, "clarity and 
consistency of objectives of decentralisation programme', 'extent of comprehensiveness in 
the initial formulation of the programme', 'direction and leadership of the programme', 'the 
adequate availability of resources' ,'inter-organisation linkages' and the attitudinal factors and 
capability of the officiais giving leadership to the decentralisation exercise had been identified 
as important factors influencing the success or the failure of decentralisation exercises (5). 
Although this form of analysis of administrative structures has a value at a certain level of 
policy formulation it is inadequate for several reasons. One of the main problems of this 
perspective arises because it looks at the administrative structures in isolation from the 
historical and societal processes of which they are a part. ln tact the very emergence of 
these structures are dependent on societal processes and the latter continue to influence the 
manner in which these structures are able to function. As this form of analysis does not give 
adequate importance to these societal processes underlying 'decentralisation', it actually 
lumps together very different exercises under a single term 'decentralisation' although all of 
them apparently reduce the power of the central government. For example privatisation of 
the production processes emerges from quite a different set of socio-political processes from 
that demanding devolution of political power, so does decentralisation. What is more 
important is that these varied socio-political processes bringing about these polices are 
relevant and have a role to play in the 'success' or the 'failure' of these exersises. 
Devoid of the historical context which creates these structures in the first place, this 
analysis attributes to these structures with a 'rationality' that allows them to change society 
and achieve the objectives for which they are set up. ln other words, according to this 
analysis these structures by themselves are capable of achieving the objective that they are 
meant for, if only those 'factors' impeding them can be rectified. But what of these factors? 
What brings them about in the first place? How can they be explained? lt is at this point that 
the analysis has to move beyond the structures to include the socio-political processes that 
bring these structures about and the power struggles accompanying them. 
Even within the tradition of administrative studies some of the authors have identified the 
importance of politics in understanding devolution or decentralisation. James Craig (6) had 
this to say in an introduction to one of his articles on decentralisation experience of Sri 
Lanka. "The main thrust of the argument is that structures and processes of administrative 
systems can only be properly understood by major attention to political factors and the way 
avants shape and crowd into the arenas in which politics and administration meet and 
interact. There appears to be increasing evidence that attempts to distil out and 
conceptualise the "administrative" fails to enhance our understanding of complex social 
reality. The study of administrative systems requires a wider horizon if it to escape the 
suffocating ideology of conventional administrative and managerial frameworks. ln tracing 
the interaction of administration and politics, difficult analytical problems certainly emerge, 
but what seems to inform the Sri Lankan experience is the centrality of the political which 
appears at the heart of the system of District Administration - almost as an independent 
variable. n 
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ln the case of the present exercise of devolution in Sri Lanka it is very important at the very 
outset to differentiate this from earlier attempts at decentralisation. The principal difference 
arises from the fact that the present exercise is a result of the emergence of ethnie 
contradictions. Therefore the ethnie conflict and the politics of the ethnie conflict have 
played the central role in bringing about devolution. Therefore any analysis of the present 
exercise of devolution should keep ethnicity and ethnie contradictions at the centre of 
analysis. lt was ethnie contradictions that gave birth to the system of devolution, and they 
are going to be important for the success or the failure of PCs. 
Ethnicity and ethnie conflicts 
ln theoretical writings of ethnicity there are two important conceptual issues that are central. 
The first is how does one understand the term ethnicity or what does one mean by it. The 
second is conceptualisation of ethnie change or transformations of ethnicity with time. 
Although these two theoretical issues are interrelated we shall take them separately for 
clarity of the presentation. 
ln literature there seem to be three approaches in understanding the term ethnicity. ln the 
first of these approaches ethnicity is equated with cultural attributes. ln other words 
ethnicity means ascriptive characteristics associated with ethnie groups, such as language, 
dress codes, cultural practices, etc. The second approach to ethnicity is to see ethnicity or 
ethnie groups as interest groups. "Here ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon, 
involving a struggle for power among ethnie groups in furtherance and defence of their 
collective interests." (7) With this approach one accepts ethnie groups to be a unit around 
which people can organise themselves and articulate their concrete material needs aven in 
a modern society. Thus the category of ethnicity becomes meaningful in understanding 
power struggles in society. The third approach to ethnicity is to see it primarily as an 
identity. "Two important implications stem from this perspective. First it makes no 
assumption about the 'content' of ethnicity: ethnie groups provide an organisational vessai 
that may be given varying amounts and for ms in different socio- cultural systems. Second 
the critical focus of investigation from this standpoint become the ethnie boundary that 
defines the group and not the cultural stuff that it encloses. "(8) For this perspective all 
questions related to identity formation and their transformation in history become the focus 
of analysis. 
The next important issue is the question of ethnie change or transformations in ethnicity. lt 
is in this domain that most of the conventional or 'common sense' understandings of 
ethnicity fail. Most of the conventional approaches to 'ethnicity' are based on soma form of 
ahistorical psychologism. Here the origin of 'ethnicity' is seen in the domain of psyche of 
the collective or community. lt is something that is deeply embedded in the psyche and 
ethnie conflicts are manifestations of this. Thus the driving force of ethnicity has very little 
to do with processes taking place outside the psyche and therefore in the wider society. 
Most of these psychological explanations of ethnicity are ahistorical. ln fact they do not 
have a theory of ethnie change. What they cannot explain is the different manifestations 
of 'ethnicity' at different historical periods. For example why is that we have seen in Sri 
Lanka an aggravation of the ethnie conflict in the seventies and eighties if it was a property 
of the collective psyche of Sinhalese and Tamils all along? Not only this, the nature of the 
manifestations of the ethnie phenomena differ during different historical periods. An 
ahistorical approach to ethnicity cannot explain this either. lt is to explain these specific 
manifestations of ethnie phenomena that it is necessary to link it with the processes taking 
place in the wider society and therefore analyse it within the historical context. 
Study of ethnie change also suffered to a certain extent because soma of the dominant 
branches of social sciences did not give sufficient attention to it. An example is provided by 
prevalent 'Development theories'. Most of the dominant development theories either ignored 
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the phenomenon of ethnicity or relegated it to the past as a dying feature. ln the case of 
development theories that linked 'development' with 'modernisation' ethnie phenomena 
were relegated to the traditional sphere. lt was expected that with development and 
modernisation ascriptive characteristics such as ethnie identity would become less important. 
They would be replaced by acquired characteristics such as identities arising from 
occupations. The societal processes were expected to be governed more by these acquired 
identities and 'rational' criteria. At the same time, getting rid of such traditional features like 
ethnicity was important for 'development' and progress.Thus these theories not only 
relegated ethnicity to the past but also saw it 'disappearing' in the future. ln other words 
this theory of ethnie change hoped that ethnicity would disappear in the future and in fact 
advocated this for the sake of 'development'. 
This approach towards ethnie change was very much based on equating ethnicity with 
cultural attributes. "Given a definition of ethnie groups as cultural groups, it followed 
inevitably that a concept like assimilation should develop as a central tool of analysis in 
understanding ethnie change." (9) Thus 'modernisation' was expected to assimilate ethnie 
identities into new universal identities .. 
At a theoretical level there are parallels between the modernisation approach and the 
orthodox Marxist view. Like the modernisation approach the latter relegates ethnicity to the 
past.This form of analysis expected class to be the major driving force in history. Asin the 
case of modernisation theory here also we see the expectation of replacement of one social 
category by another. ln the case of orthodox Marxist theories this was expected with the 
development of capitalist relations. This orthodox analysis expected the categories that are 
operative at the level of relations of production to be determinant and predominant. Sorne 
of the trends of this dominant economism aven expected some nations to be 'non-historie'. 
The dynamism of capitalism was expected to absorb these nations into larger entities and 
their individual identity was to disappear. Very often when ethnicity continue to prevail 
despite the expectation of this form of analysis it is explained away as a 'manipulation of 
the ruling class.' 
Dominant development theories also begin with the acceptance of the nation-state as given. 
ln the case of the third world countries once they have emerged from colonialism, the 
political entity that emerged was equated with the nation. What was missing was the 
concept of nation formation. This would mean that although a political entity called the state 
had been formed it cannot be equated with a nation. Nation formation is a much longer 
process than the formation of astate. ln the case of multiethnic societies the establishment 
of a social contract between ethnie groups who are found within a society is important in 
the formation of a nation. But the prevalent development theories accepted the nation-state 
as given and then the concern was development. 
ln a way development theories became a part and parcel of the dominant nationalism, which 
in many countries coincided with ethnie nationalism of the majority ethnie group. The main 
concern of the development theories was to strengthen the nation state and the dominant 
ethnie nationalism that had an hegemonic position within it. Depending on the framework 
of analysis each version of development theories advocated what has to be done in order 
to achieve the goals of development and what to do with ethnicity and ethnie nationalisms. 
For the modernisation theory it was a question of overcoming these traditional aspects of 
the society. The dependency theory on the other hand looked towards the restructuring of 
relationships with the 'Centre' countries so as to strengthen the nation state. The orthodox 
Marxists looked towards a rearrangement of class relations. For all of them ethnicity or 
ethnie loyalties was either a remnant of the past, a divisive force that weakens the nation 
state or hinders the revolutionary process, or at best a nuisance. At present there is soma 
recognition of this shortcoming in the dominant development theories, and soma scholars 
have considered the incorporation of ethnicity into development theories as an important 
5 
theoretical task awaiting to be done.(10) 
ln this paper we will be understanding ethnicity as an 'interest group' and as an 'identity'. 
lt is a combination of the second and the third approaches mentioned above. For us ethnicity 
is a category that has a real existence in society and gets reproduced in society. lt has a 
basis in material practices and institutions which help to reproduce it. There is also no 
inevitability of its disappearence. Secondly, ethnicity can form the organising principle for 
people brought together by a common ethnie identity, to group together as an interest group 
in order to struggle for resources or power in society. This struggle is based on organisations 
and material practices that have a real existence in society. Therefore it cannot be wished 
away as a 'taise consciousness' or 'a manipulation of the alite'. On the other hand we also 
need to ask "how the sense of ethnie identity is generated and transmitted, how it persists 
and how it is transformed or disappears, yielding to other forms of identities". Under 
different historical circumstance it can transform itself to emerge in different forms. 
Therefore it is a socially constructed category that changes according to historical 
circumstances. 
Ethnicity can be viewed as some kind of a reservoir for formation of identities. The 
socialisation process of human beings is carried out through institutions that produce and 
reproduce ethnie identities. Therefore it is always present as a reservoir that can give an 
input for the formation of identities of individual human beings. Hence its strength and 
prevalence over a long period of time. However more than at the level of individual human 
beings, what interests us here is the emergence of ethnie identities at the societal levai as 
ideological systems and politicisation of them. This is certainly related to the processes that 
take place in the wider society. The emergence and transformation of ethnie identities do 
not take place in isolation from the societal processes. Given the necessary conditions, these 
societal processes can transform ethnicity to a highly politicised ideology that lies at the 
basis of social conflicts. 
ln the case of ethnie conflicts the issue is to understand the underlying process which 
transforms ethnicity which at one level is only an empirical tact that describes an ethnie 
group (ethnicity as a cultural attributs) into highly politicised movements. These politicised 
movements are manifestations of ethnicity as an identity and as an interest group. ln 
situations of ethnie conflict what is more relevant is the more politicised form of ethnicity. 
Therefore in this paper when we use the term ethnicity or ethnie identity what we mean is 
the politicised manifestations of it. lt is not that other forms do not exist. But in order to 
understand the ethnie conflicts it is necessary to focus attention on the politicised forms of 
it. 
ln understanding the emergence of ethnie identities and ethnie conflicts it might be difficult 
to arrive at generalisations that are of a universal nature. lt is quite possible that there are 
social phenomena that cannot be generalised at a universal level. Sorne writers have corne 
to similar conclusions in studying a phenomenon like nationalism (11 ). If this is true in the 
case of nationalism it might be more likely for ethnicity. Ethnicity need not evolve in a 
unilinear fashion. Therefore it might be difficult to speak about 'decline' or 'ascendancy' of 
ethnicity in a unilinear fashion. What might be more useful is concrets analysis taking into 
account the specificities of the situation. 
Part Il- Devolution and ethnie conflict of Sri Lanka 
Sri Lankais a multiethnic society. According to 1981 census Sinhalese (74.6%), Sri Lankan 
Tamils (12.6%), lndian Tamils (5.5%) and Muslims (7.4%) - Moors (7.1 %) Malays (0.3%)-
form the major ethnie groups. As Sri Lanka was moving towards independence, in discussing 
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the question of the state structure the mutiethnic character of the Sri Lankan society became 
a crucial issue. Although in the late twenties soma of the political leaders and 
representatives of certain ethnie groups put forward the idea of a faderai constitution for Sri 
Lanka, this did not materialise. Sri Lanka emerged into independence with a unitary form of 
government. ln order to safeguard the rights of minorities there was dependence on checks 
and balances at the Centre. Distribution of seats in parliament so that there was soma sort 
of balanced representation, multimember constituencies where there were pockets of 
minorities, a second chamber to which minority representatives could be appointed and 
clauses in the constitution to safeguard the rights of the minorities were soma of the 
measures adopted. 
The history of the breakdown of ethnie relations in the post independent Sri Lanka was the 
history of ineffectiveness of these safeguards at the centre. The ineffectiveness of these 
safeguards were shown with the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a dominant 
political force. The electoral process helped to bring these pressures on the state. The 
elections of 1956 and coming into power of a government with a hegemonic Sinhala 
Buddhist ideology were a turning point in this process. Although the influence of this 
ideology was seen immediately after independence, when a section of a minority was 
disenfranchised, it was after 1956 that Sinhala Buddhist nationalism became the dominant 
ideology of the ruling class. lt is from this point onwards that a class block consisting of 
Sinhala bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie began to share state power. One result of this 
was the state dominated populist development policies within a capitalist framework and the 
other was the hegemony of Sinhala Buddhist ideology and systematic dismantling of the 
safeguards for the minorities that were introduced at the time of independence. 
This process shows the contradictions of a bourgeois democratic system in a multiethnic 
society. On one side the hegemony of Sinhala Buddhist ideology at the level of the state was 
achieved through the electoral process, which was a manifestation of this democracy. On 
the other hand this was done by denying rights to the minorities. Once ethnie consciousness 
began to dominate the electoral process, it was used by all groups who had a chance of 
ruling the country, for their own political ends.The mass consciousness was also dominated 
by ethnicity.Even the ruling sections whose objective interests within an internationally 
operative capitalist system was to overcome narrow ethnie nationalism, began to play 
politics with it in order to stay in power. This of course does not mean that ethnicity in 
politics is only a result of 'manipulation by the ruling classes.' On the other hand ethnicity 
has a real existence within the mass consciousness. This is true of all ethnie groups. Both 
the rulers and the ruled form a part of a society where ethnie consciousness has corne to 
dominate. 
The response of the minorities to the process of emergence of Sinhala Buddhist ideology 
primarily came from the Sri Lankan Tamils who form the numerically biggest minority. The 
Tamil political leadership agreed to the safeguards at the centre at the time of independence, 
although the demands of soma were more than what was agreed upon.These demands soon 
changed to one based on a regional concept. ln the mid fifties the majority Tamil party put 
forward the demand for a faderai system of government and by the early seventies this had 
escalated to one demanding a separate state.The enactment of the first republican 
constitution in 1972 saw the emergence of the separatist demand and the beginning of the 
armed groups within the Tamil social formation. This constitution removed the safeguards 
that were there in the previous one, gave pre-eminence to Buddhism in addition to the 
Sinhala Language which was already entrenched in the constitution, and concentrated ail 
power in the Sinhala dominated legislature. The early seventies also saw the aggravation of 
the ethnie relations due to the introduction of new admission schemes for entrance into the 
university. These schemes had discriminatory elements vis a vis the Tamil students. 
Escalation of these demands also saw the emergence of a new political leadership within the 
Sri Lankan Tamils and change in the form of the political struggle. The social background of 
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the leadership was more of a petty bourgeois character. They were less westernised than 
the earlier leadership, and were based in the Northern Province where there is a 
concentration of a Tamil population.For them armed struggle became the dominant form of 
political activity. 
Thus by the time the general election was held in 1977 the ethnie contradictions had already 
aggravated. This had resulted in the Tamil United Liberation Front that spearheaded the 
demand for separate state not only sweeping the electorate in the North and to a lasser 
extent in the East, but also becoming the major opposition party. For the first time in the 
Sri Lankan history parliament also reflected the ethnie polarisation in the country. While the 
United National Party with a five-sixth majority obtained largely from the Sinhala majority 
was on the government sida, the Tamil United Liberation Front was leading the opposition 
after winning the Tamil vote on a separate state demand. 
Sri Lanka's ethnie conflict was aggravated to a level of a civil war in certain parts of the 
country within a very short period of the emergence of armed struggle as the dominant form 
of political struggle on the part of the Sri Lankan Tamil minority. The armed struggle of the 
Tamil militants developed into a qualitatively new stage after the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 
1983. This saw the migration of more than one hundred thousand refugees from Sri Lanka 
to the Tamil Nadu State in lndia. This not only gave more recruits to the Tamil militant 
movements, but also paved the way for the involvement of lndia. Within a short period of 
four years this conflict escalated with a heavy toll on the Sri Lankan society. 
The aggravating conflict process also brought back the concept of regional autonomy as a 
way out of the situation. Therefore once again the idea that had been rejected by the Sri 
Lankan majority as a solution to the ethnie problem several times, came back to the political 
arena. Of course this time it had emerged with the ethnie contradiction at a much higher 
stage of development and with the participation of lndia in the whole process. 
The first mentioning of a scheme for devolution of power through a regional autonomy 
framework within the context of the aggravation of the ethnie conflict in the seventies and 
eighties came about in the so called annexure 'C'.This was a document that emerged from 
a meeting between the Prime Minister of lndia and President of Sri Lanka after lndia got 
involved in Sri Lanka's problem. This came about after the anti-Tamil pogrom of July '83. 
However this document could not get the approval of the Ali Party Conference that was 
summoned to look for solutions for the ethnie conflict after the July'83 incidents.This was 
a conference that the U.N.P. government promised in its election manifesto, but was called 
only after massive violence of July '83. Despite this, the internai actors who took part in 
the Ali Party Conference, which included members of all political parties, could not go 
beyond a framework of District Development Councils, that was already in place , as a 
solution to the problem.While the internai actors were still unable to think beyond this limited 
framework, the conflict intensified significantly, lndia getting involved in the whole process 
in a much bigger way. The conflict generated much international publicity and the impact on 
the economy also becoming significant. 
The dynamics of the conflict finally took a new turn with the signing of the lndo-Sri Lanka 
Accord in July 198 7. This is the first official document signed by a Head of State of Sri 
Lanka that had accepted the multiethnic character of the Sri Lankan society and the need 
for devolution of power to the North and Eastern Provinces so as to meet the grievances of 
the Tamil people. This resulted in legislation being brought in order to set up Provincial 
Councils.Thus the the ethnie conflict has brought the regional concept as a way out of the 
situation firmly back into the political discourse. lt will be extremely difficult to go against 
this historical trend without suggesting a viable alternative in its place. 
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This struggle of ethnie minorities in Sri Lanka is basically a struggle for control over land 
in the areas where they predominate. This can be analysed as having several dimensions: 
political; a dimension related to ethnie identity; a socio- economic dimension and finally a 
dimension related to the basic security of an ethnie group. The political dimension is related 
to the demand to have greater political power in the areas where there is a concentration 
of an ethnie group. The emergence of political structures granting a certain degree of 
devolution is related to this. The second aspect of identity emerges because the ethnie 
identity of an ethnie group becomes strongly tied up with the land on which an ethnie group 
has lived for generations. The control over land also has a socio-economic angle. This is 
related to control over resources of that area. Finally the sense of security that an ethnie 
group has is related to the land that they have inhabited for generations. As a result ethnie 
conflicts very easily touch upon very basic concerns of ethnie groups like their security. 
ln the case of Sri Lanka the specific geographical distribution of the ethnie groups has helped 
to link the 'ethnicity' of different ethnie groups with a particular part of the country. This 
has become prominent in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils. lt might not be so clear in the 
case of Muslims and lndian Tamils .. However a cl oser look into the development of ethnie 
identities of these two groups in recent times shows that there is a linkage between their 
identities and geographical areas in these cases as well. The geographical areas relevant are 
parts of the Eastern Province in the case of the Muslim minority and parts of the Central 
Province in the case of the lndian Tamil community. Thus linkage between ethnie identities 
and geographical space is not a phenomena associated only with Sri Lankan Tamils, although 
their case is heard loud and clear. This is a phenomenon associated with the other two major 
minority ethnie groups as well. 
Therefore the transfer of power from a centralised system to a devolved one is an attempt 
to redues the power of the central government over a geographical area which now cornes 
under the control of the Provincial Council. ln the case of geographical areas with a 
concentration of a certain ethnie group, this will amount to transferring power to their 
representatives. This is bound to be accompanied by processes that are contradictory and 
conflictual.The Provincial Councils have to operate within these contradictory processes. 
Their success or the failure will be determined by their capacity to mediate within these 
contradictions. 
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Part Ill- Ethno-political processes in the Central Province 
The Table 1 below gives the ethnie composition of the Central Province at the time of 1981 
Census. 
Table 1 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya C.P. 
Sin hala 74.29 79.85 42.14 65.62 
S.L.Tamil 5.04 5.76 12.67 7.46 
lnd.Tamil 9.39 6.97 42.66 18.95 
S.L.Moor 10.47 6.99 2.02 7.31 
Burgher 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.15 
Malay 0.26 0.16 0.19 0.22 
Other 0.35 0.19 0.21 0.28 
Source: Census of population and housing 1981 
lt shows that the Province as a whole is multiethnic. Almost 35 per cent of the population 
of the Province does not belong to the majority community. Secondly Nuwara Eliya is a 
district with a clear Tamil speaking majority. Close to 43 par cent of the population of this 
district is from the lndian Tamil ethnie background. They also form the biggest minority 
group in the Province with 1 9 percentage points. 
When looking at these data on the ethnie composition one must remember the tendency of 
some sections of the lndian Tamil population to identify themselves as Sri Lankan Tamils 
once they have obtained Sri Lankan citizenship. This had been noted by soma researchers 
and in Census reports(12),(13). According to a Census report "little over two hundred 
thousand lndian Tamils have reported themselves as Sri Lankan Tamils"(14) during the 1981 
census. This was about 24% of the lndian Tamil population at that time. Therefore the 
actual percentage of lndian Tamils in the Central Province should be higher than the 19% 
stated above. lt is somewhere between 19 to 26.5 par cent. The latter figure is the total of 
lndian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils in the Central Province. 
Due to the presence of the lndian Tamil population the Central Province also has a 
concentration of non-citizens. According to Census data of 1981 around 15 per cent of the 
population of the Province fall into this category. From this close to 1 0 par cent is 
concentrated in the Nuwara Eliya district. However this category of people is bound to get 
reduced as more and more people of lndian Tamil origin are granted Sri Lankan citizenship. 
The Central Province is not only multiethnic, but over the years it has got ethnically 
segregated. An analysis of figures for ethnie distribution of the population in the Province 
for 1971 and 1981 brings this out. 
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Table 2 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya 
'71 '81 '71 '81 '71 '81 
Sinhalese 62.3 74.3 74.5 80.0 40.2 42.1 
Sri Lankan Tamil 4.0 5.0 3.5 5.8 4.1 12.7 
lndian Tamil 24.1 9.4 14.9 7.0 52.3 42.7 
Sri Lankan Moor 8.2 10.5 6.4 7.0 1.6 2.0 
Burger 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Malay 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Other 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Census Reports, 1971 & 1981 
Analysing these changes in the ethnie distribution of the Province a recent study noted that 
" ... between 1971 and 1981 while there was a return migration of lndian Tamils from Sri 
Lanka to lndia there was a parallel movement of lndian Tamils from mid country plantation 
areas where they are outnumbered by the Sinhalese towards their own ethnie concentrations 
in Nuwara Eliya and Vavuniya districts." (15) The mid country plantation areas specially 
mentioned in the article were Kandy and Matale. " ln the districts of Kandy and Matale 
representing the mid country plantation areas the decline in the number of lndian Tamils is 
twice the average for the whole island. "( 16) ln 1981, 30 par cent of the lndian Tamils of 
Sri Lanka lived in the Nuwara Eliya district and the entire Central Province had of this 
ethnie group. 
The drop in the proportion of the lndian Tamil population in the Kandy district from 24.1 per 
cent in 19 71 to 9.4 par cent in 1981 is qui te significant. Although their proportion had got 
reduced in the other two districts as well, it has not reached the same magnitude. On the 
other hand Kandy shows 12% increase in the proportion of the Sinhalese. This is the highest 
for any district in Sri Lanka during the intercensal period. 
lt seems that Kandy is a district from where there was repatriation proportionately larger 
than from other districts. During the intercensal period Nuwara Eliya is the district that 
shows a negative population growth- obviously a result of the repatriation process. However 
when the migration figures are taken the outmigration from the Kandy district is much higher 
than from the Nuwara Eliya district in absolute terms.This could have been because of a 
repatriation of a large section of the lndian Tamil population from the Kandy district. The 
population changes between the intercensal period have made Kandy a predominantly a 
Sinhala district, while there is a concentration of lndian Tamil population in the Nuwara Eliya 
district. 
If we take the changes in the ethnie composition of the population between 1946 and 1981 
the picture is much more striking. 
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Table 3 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya 
s l.T s l.T s l.T 
1946 57.8 29.2 68.1 21.9 37.8 57.3 
1953 58.0 30.5 69.1 20.2 35.8 59.2 
1963 59.8 28.2 72.3 17.3 38.4 56.8 
1971 62.2 24.5 74.1 15.3 41.3 51.7 
1981 75.0 9.3 78.9 6.8 35.9 47.3 
Source: Census Reports for different years 
Concentration of the lndian Tamils in the Nuwara Eliya district is a result of an out flow of 
this population to relatively safe areas. One of the areas from which an outflow has taken 
place are the mid country astates. Mid-country astates existing in a different setting from 
the classical plantation area came under a lot of pressure from outside forces. lt must also 
be remembered these were areas where much of JVP activity was seen during the 1971 
insurgency. This was the beginning of the entry of violence into the political dynamics of the 
mid-country. Since then the role of violence in various forms had increased in these areas. 
These areas had been also been subjected to anti-Tamil pogroms at various times. As 
concluded by one of the researchers " the outflow of lndian Tamils from mid country areas 
can be seen as a result of series of coercive pressures emanating from the organs of the 
state, political parties and unorganised bands of rural people. The pressures operating in the 
area include legal, political and administrative action on one hand and physical violence 
directed against them on the other. "(17) Similar processes could have affected the 
movement and resulting ethnie segregation that we already observed in the Central Province. 
As a result of these processes " it is clear that Nuwara Eliya district has been identified and 
used as a place of refuge by the lndian Tamils fleeing from other areas"(18) 
The ethnie composition of the Central Province shows us that there are three ethno-social 
groups who are important in order to understand the ethno-political processes of this area 
that any Provincial Council has to deal with. lndian Tamil plantation labour, Kandyan 
Sinhalese with a large peasant population and Muslims who seem to have a relatively higher 
urban presence are these ethno-social groups. We shall now go on to analyse the 
ethno-political tendencies among these groups in order to lay the background for the 
discussion that will follow. 
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lndian Tamil Plantation Labour* 
According to 1981 census the total lndian Tamil population in Sri Lanka was 818656. Of 
them 644255, that is 78 percent were lived in the astate sector. At the same time 71.4 
per cent of the astate population was from the lndian Tamil ethnie background. Therefore 
still the fate of the lndian Tamil ethnie group is closely tied up with the estate sector. 
Most available analyses on the nature of the plantation labour have regarded them as an 
integral part of the plantation system established during the colonial period.This system had 
all the characteristics of a 'total institution'(19). lt regulated almost every aspect of the lives 
of the people living in it. ln most plantation systems labour has been immigrant and 
ethnically different from the indigenous population. This was the situation in Sri Lanka too; 
segregated from the rest of the society by the system of production, by ethnie 
characteristics, by the lack of citizenship rights, plantation labour was necessarily confined 
within the plantation system. ln this sense, although plantations have been described as a 
'modern' sector of the economy when compared with the peasant sector and with a wage 
labour relationship, this labour was not 'free' in the strict sense. lt did not have the freedom 
to sell labour freely.lt was in reality a captive labour force confined to the plantation system. 
The plantation system was also the basis for the type of consciousness which developed 
within this labour force. They have corne to see their lives and their future as being closely 
linked with and dependent on the plantation system. This is not surprising for a population 
that lived and worked within the plantations for such a long time. The provision of jobs, 
living quarters, education and health facilities, the birth of their children, religious activities, 
and finally aven the burial ground are all located within the plantation system. Therefore in 
the development of their identity , except for such characteristics as their language and 
religion, the association with the plantations is extremely strong. 
Not only the consciousness of plantation labour, but also the prevalent attitudes of outsiders 
towards plantation labour were on the basis that they formed a part of the plantation 
system.They were considered as a form of 'captive labour' confined to the plantations, 
ethnically segregated, without citizenship rights and therefore with a limited role in the wider 
society. ln this context trade unionism has been the most important form of organised 
action; union mobilisation has been high and through this form of struggle certain rights have 
been secured. Other social action groups working among them have concentrated on 
improvement of their living conditions. Behind both these strategies - unionisation and 
welfare work - there is the implicit recognition that this section of labour are an ethnie 
minority without political rights and are more or less confined to the plantations. Therefore 
all attempts are limited either to winning them certain concessions making use of the fact 
that they are in an organised sector with a legal structure of labour laws or to improving 
their living standards within the confines of the plantation system. This approach to 
plantation labour is despite the fact that they form the working class in a major sector of 
the economy. As organised labour in this all important sector of the economy they wield 
considerable power. However strategies of working among them have not paid attention 
to using this power in a political sense. 
*The term lndian Tamil labour is used in this paper with some hesitation. There is a growing 
demand from the more politically articulate sections of this population to use the term 'Hill 
country Tamils or 'Kandyan Tamils' instead of the term lndian Tamils. The reflects a need 
for a new identity among this population once they have been given Sri lankan citizenship. 
These tendencies in identity formation are discussed later in this paper. However the term 
lndian Tamils is used here for the sake of clarity keeping in mind a wider audience, but the 
author has no objections if the term lndian Tamils is replaced by the term 'Hill country 
Tamils' wherever it appears. 
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However the plantation system in Sri Lanka has not remained static over the years. The 
system that began with private capital and a captive labour force of lndian Tamil origin has 
undergone significant changes. The state take over of the plantations through nationalisation 
and granting of citizenship rights to a section of the plantation population, have changed the 
character of the plantation system fundamentally. These changes have had an impact on 
various aspects of the lives of the lndian Tamil plantation labour, including their role in the 
political arena. This has been been supplemented by the emergence of the ethnie conflict as 
a major contradiction in the Sri Lankan society. 
- Contradictions of Nationalisation 
'Nationalisation' or state take over of various sectors of the economy was an idea first put 
forward by leftist political parties of Sri Lanka in keeping with the state ownership modal 
of socialism that developed in what one social scientist has called 'actually existing socialist 
countries'(20). This idea had its influence on newly independent Third World countries which 
were basically functioning under a capitalist framework. Intervention of the state was 
legitimised not only as a means of economic growth but also as an instrument of social 
transformation towards socialism. ln addition many arguments of social justice were brought 
forward to justify it. According to this argument state intervention was a means of rectifying 
social injustices. Sorne leftist ideologues termed it as a 'non capitalist path of development' 
to distinguish it from the capitalism traditionally based on private capital and from 
'socialism'of 'actually existing socialist countries'. This terms also implied that this 'non 
capitalist sector' would play a positive role in the transformation to socialism. 
ln the case of Sri Lanka the idea of 'nationalisation' was taken up by populist elements of 
various political colouring. Basically it advocated a change of ownership from private to 
state, and in soma instances an expansion of the role of state into new areas within a 
capitalist framework. Through this intervention of the state what emerged was what is now 
called the 'corporation' sector, which is a form of existence of state capitalism. Although 
often put forward as a step towards socialism, the corporation sector of Sri Lanka in no way 
changed the ownership structures so as to bring about a transformation of production 
relations for the benefit of the working people. lts main achievement has been to maintain 
a state capitalist sector and perhaps helped to generate a new bureaucratie class linked to 
it. 
The state take over of various sectors of the economy in a society like Sri Lankais backed 
by certain socio-political and ideological forces. lt serves the interests of various groups in 
society. For certain sections of the ruling classes of Sri Lanka, who find themselves as 
members of the ruling group at a particular time, the State is the major channel for capital 
accumulation and for the appropriation of other resources. Lacking their own means of 
accumulation, state take over of various sectors of the economy becomes a major channel 
for their accumulation and mobility. The State sector also serves their more short term 
needs; it enables them to maintain their political base through the distribution of benefits to 
their constituencies. This forms the basis for the political patronage system operating 
through the state sector. 
Other than these class forces, the expansion of the state into various sectors of the 
economy was also backed by nationalist and sometimes populist ideologies. Taking over of 
sectors of the economy hitherto dominated by foreign capital and other 'alien' elements is 
the ideological argument put forward. These arguments have been used by the ruling classes 
when intervening in many areas of the economy. The very word 'nationalisation' reflects 
this nationalist ideology. 
Nationalisation of the plantations was a measure motivated by both these class and 
nationalist/populist elements and interests. lt transferred the bulk of the land owned by 
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Agency Houses to two State Corporations. They are now run as state capitalist ventures. 
By this an important sector of the economy came under state control and under class forces 
dominating the state. As shown by Table 4 around one third of the total plantation acreage 
is now under state control. However when it cornes to Tea, which is the industry employing 
the bulk of the labour force, around two third of the acreage is under state ownership. This 
also means that close to 85% of the labour employed in the plantation sector cornes under 
the state. 
Table 4 
Distribution Plantation Acreage by ownership categories ( 1981) 
Tea% Rubber% Coconut% Ali Crops% 
State Plantations 61.5 32 10 29 
Private Estates 17.0 20 30 24 
Small Holdings 21.5 48 60 47 
Total extent (ha) 244,840 208,420 445,000 894,550 
Source: D.Wesumperuma, W.Gooneratne - Plantation Agriculture in Sri Lanka - An overview 
of Employment and Development prospects - in "Plantation Agriculture in Sri Lanka - Issues 
in Employment and Development" - ILO-ARTEP-Bangkok-1984 
The take over of plantations marked almost the end of the long period of expansion of state 
sector in the economy. But it was also a taking over of a very important sector . From then 
onwards this sector was also available as a source of political patronage and accumulation 
for the political forces controlling the state. 
The take over of plantations was also an appeasement of a nationalist demand by taking 
over a sector that was brought into this country through colonialism and identified with 
foreign control. lt was taking over of a major symbol of colonialism. To the nationalist forces 
backing the state take over, even the labour force working in plantations was 'alien' and 
brought in by foreigners. As the ideological argument goes the plantation were in land 
traditionally owned by up country Sinhalese. This land was taken over by colonial powers 
and plantations established and they also brought in and settled an 'alien' population in 
them. Therefore taking over of these astates by a state supported largely by Sinhala 
nationalist forces, was a manifestation of nationalism as well. 
Certainly there have been many positive developments in the living and working conditions 
of the plantation labour during the post-nationalisation period. However this is more a result 
of the newly acquired political power enjoyed by this population rather than a direct 
consequence of them coming under state control. The state ownership did not bring about 
any changes in their structural position within the system of production. They still form an 
exploited workforce within astate capitalist system. Many problems of this population arise 
from this structural position of the plantation labour. ln addition as we shall show the 
growth of the influence of Sinhala nationalist forces dominating the state in the astate sector 
had a negative impact of the plantation labour. This shows the contradictory character of 
'nationalisation'. An understanding of these contradictions is necessary for a proper 
'evaluation' of 'nationalisation'. 
The contradictory character of state take over of plantations was demonstrated at the very 
early stages of nationalisation when violence erupted in plantations. ln soma areas take over 
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of plantations was accompanied with demonstrations and marches into plantations organised 
by Sinhala nationalist elements. Workers were ejected from astates in Kandy, Gampola, 
Kotmale, Matale and Nawalapitiya areas. On 11 th March 1972, when workers were 
protesting against the mode of land alienation at Devon astate, a young astate labourer was 
shot dead by the police. This was followed by looting and attacks on plantation workers in 
Delta, North Tea and Sanger estates.(21) There is much evidence to show that, at the time 
of the take over of land after nationalisation lndian Tamil plantation workers were at the 
receiving end of racist attacks inspired by Sinhala nationalist elements. This was actually the 
beginning of a phase of ethnie violence in the plantation sector. 
The other contradiction of the early stages of nationalisation arose from the fact that 
plantation labour was discriminated against in the new forms of management that was 
introduced into some astates taken over. Land reform saw some of the astates coming 
under co-operative forms of management. Stateless lndian labour was debarred from 
membership of these cooperatives. At the same time the trade union rights that so far 
existed in the astates taken over by these cooperatives also got suspended. " Of these 
institutions Usawasama* managed nearly 240 properties covering about 35,208 ha .... and 
electoral level co-op managed about 68, 798 ha of astate land.' .. "ln early 1977 there were 
some 195 Janawasas covering an area of about 20,000 ha. "(22) 
These new forms of management were motivated by a desire to transform the highly 
hierarachichal forms of plantation management that existed in the plantation sector. The idea 
was to allow 'greater participation' of the workforce in the management structures. However 
backed only by Sinhala nationalist forces these 'progressive' motivations could not include 
the minority lndian Tamil working class who have laboured in these astates for generations. 
This shows the contradictions of a seemingly 'progressive' idea when it cannot cross an 
ethnie barrier and excludes the working people directly attached to the industry. ln other 
words however much there was a desire for 'participation' in the new management 
structures that could not be brought about once people who have worked in these astates 
were debarred. On the other hand these measures actually turned out to be discriminatory 
against these workers. 
Although these early problems of nationalisation were somewhat rectified with the change 
of government and scrapping of these cooperative forms of management, they show the 
contradictions that underlie the nationalisation process backed by nationalist and populist 
forces. So far as the plantations retained the 'enclave' character under the ownership of 
private capital either foreign or local, they were somewhat insulated from the pressures of 
'outside' forces. State take over meant an opening of these astates to 'outside forces', 
specially to those enjoying state power. This had the potential of going against the interests 
of the lndian Tamil labour who lacked citizenship rights, political rights and also belonged to 
a minority ethnie group. 
The same process is seen in the pressures for employment and in the demand for astate land 
for various pur poses from the adjoining rural sector. This too was a result of the 'opening 
up' that 'nationalisation' brought about. Table 5 given below shows the changes in the 
composition of the labour force in a selected sample of state owned astates between 1975 
and 1978. "Absorption of village labour was greater in low-grown and mid-grown areas 
where villages are located in close proximity to astates." (23) The other important tendency 
was the recruitment of village labour for such middle level supervisory grade jobs like field 
supervisors, crache attendants, etc .. This not only limited the opportunities for mobility for 
astates workers, but also placed recently recruited village labour from Sinhala background 
in a supervisory grade above the lndian Tamil labour. There is a lot of evidence to show that 
this situation has led to tensions in the astate sector. (24) 
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Table 5 
Changes in the Composition of the Labour Force, 1975 & 1978 
(Percentage of total labour force) 
Estate 1975-pre reform 1978-post reform 
Non-resident Resident Non-resident Re si dent 
Sinhala Tamil Sinhala Tamil 
Allerton 15 85 22 78 
Helbodde 9 91 14 86 
Delta 11 89 17 83 
Kelliawatte 0 100 20 80 
Passa ra 2 98 8 92 
Dickwella 14 86 25 75 
Sources: N.A.Pernando - op.cit.-1984 
These pressures for employment continued even after 1977 under the UNP government. "ln 
1977, the Ministry of Plantation Industries issued a directive to all public sector astates to 
increase their employment rates to 3.71 labour units per ha of Tea and 1.85-2.47 labour 
units per ha of rubber. ln response to this many JEDB and SPC astates increased 
employment in 1977 and 1978 by recruiting more village labour, though in many cases this 
may have led to redundant labour. "(25) According to the Central Bank Report of 1969, 69% 
of the total increase of new employment opportunities was in these two state 
corporations. (26) 
As a result of the influx of village labour into the astate sector there is a sizeable proportion 
of non- resident village labour in the state owned plantation sector. Table 6 illustrates this 
for SLSPC and JEDB. These tables clearly shows that Board ragions that falls within the 
Central Province (Hatton, Matale, Nuwara Eliya and Haputale for SLSPC and Hatton, Nuwara 
Eliya and Nawalapitiya for JEDB) still depend largely on resident lndian Tamil labour force. 
These are mainly up country astates cultivating Tea. On the other hand astates of Uva, 
Sabaragamuwa, Southern Provinces are the areas where there is a significant proportion of 
non-resident village labour. The same is true of astates of the Kalutara, Kurunegala and 
Puttalam districts. The areas where there is a greater proportion of Sinhala labour also show 
a mixed cropping pattern. 
ln interpreting this data it must be remembered that a part of the plantation sector had 
Sinhala labour coming from the villages working in them long before 'nationalisation'. This 
is specially true of the Coconut astates in the Kurunegala and Puttalam districts and also of 
astates of the Southern Province and Kalutara districts. Therefore it is the astates in Uva, 
Sabaragamuwa Provinces and to a lasser extent astates of the Southern Province where 




Board Region Resident Non-resident Total Ratio 
'000 '000 '000 
(a) (b) (c) (a/c) 
Hatton 35 0.1 35.1 1.00 
Mata le 24 6.6 30.6 0.78 
N'Eliya 28 0.3 28.3 0.98 
Haputale 23 6.2 29.2 0.77 
Balangoda 19 11.4 31.4 0.61 
Kalutara 13 12.3 25.3 0.51 
Ratnapura 15 7.2 23.2 0.65 
Galle/Matara 15 25.3 40.3 0.37 
Total 172 69.4 241.4 0.71 
Source: MTIP - Social Welfare Programme Project - General Plan of Operation - April 1980 
p.15JEDB(1987) 
Board Region Resident Non-resident Total Ratio 
(a) (b) (c) (a/c) 
Hatton 29709 919 30628 0.96 
Avissawella 13832 12092 25924 0.53 
Nuwara Eliya 48476 4501 52977 0.92 
Kandy 14239 3581 17820 0.79 
Badulla 44274 14501 58775 0.75 
Nawalapitiya 16711 2693 19594 0.85 
Kegalle 7994 7550 15544 0.53 
Kurunegala 1328 1053 2381 0.56 
Chilaw 1094 751 1845 0.59 
Total 177619 47869 225488 0.78 
Source: Housing Needs Assessment - JEDB - 1986 
The shift towards greater proportions of the Sinhala ethnie group has taken place not only 
in the workforce, but also in the resident population living in the astates. Table 7 shows the 




Population change in the astate sector 1971-1981 
District Sinhalese Tamil 
1971 1981 % ch. 1971 1981 % ch. 
Nuwara Eliya 26211 19658 -25.0 360457 287615 -20.2 
Badulla 9540 12223 +28.1 197017 146102 -25.8 
Kandy 13723 20006 +45.8 148891 104651 -29.7 
Mata le 3409 3675 +7.8 39298 25368 -35.4 
Kegalle 10718 8989 -16.1 67031 45919 -31.5 
Ratnapura 11268 12569 + 11.5 111665 93403 -16.4 
Kurunegala 9724 5129 -47.3 8042 5698 -29.1 
Ka luta ra 9854 9287 -5.8 38411 34956 -9.0 
Galle 9031 7657 -15.3 15662 13009 -16.4 
Matara 4706 5290 +12.4 18566 14690 -20.9 
Total 108184 104478 -3.4 1005040 771411 -23.2 
Source: G.H.Pieris - Changing prospects of the Plantation Workers of Sri Lanka - 1988 
This data shows that there has been a general reduction in the residential population of 
astates during the intercensal period. Estimates show "that about 98% of the overall 
reduction in the size of the esta te population between 1971 and '81 is accounted for by the 
reduction in the number of Tamils." (9). 70% of the reduction of lndian Tamil population has 
corne from three districts - Nuwara Eliya, Badulla and Kandy. 
Part of the explanation for this reduction in the proportion of lndian Tamils in the astate is 
their repatriation under the Sirima- Shastri Pact. Sorne of the other explanations include drop 
in the productivity due to disruptions of the industry just after nationalisation. While these 
explanations account partly for the reduction in the proportion of lndian Tamils, it is also true 
that the plantation sector continues to be under pressure for employment from village labour 
and soma of them have been settling in the astates. The increase in the proportion of 
Sinhala labour settling in astates has been significant for Kandy, Badulla, Matara, Ratnapura 
and Matale districts. 
Another important factor explaining the drop in this residential labour force is by the drop 
in the extent of land available for plantation crops and the resulting drop in employment 
opportunities. This brings us to the question of pressure for astate land from 'outside'. Table 




















Estate land has been taken over for various purposes under different programmes sponsored 
by the government. Various crop diversification programmes, village expansion schemes, 
settlement of people under different circumstances have claimed astate land. Once the land 
was taken over by the state under land reform laws of the seventies they were readily 
available for for these purposes. The same land reform laws debarred the bulk of the lndian 
Tamil labour from owning land because of their 'statelessness'. Thus they were not entitled 
for land under these schemes. 
An ideological basis for the demand for astate land also cornes from a historical grievance 
of Kandyan Sinhalese. lt is based on land being taken away from them for the establishment 
of plantations. Whatever may be the empirical basis of this claim, the important issue is the 
ideological force behind this claim. Ali the elements that go to make land as a base for 
ethnie conflicts are found in this grievance. ln addition the Sinhala ethnie group has also 
wielded political power in order to redress these grievances. 
Basically nationalisation can be viewed as a step that broke the 'enclave' character of the 
plantation system with the backing of Sinhala populist forces within a framework of 
capitalism. These 'outside' forces were able to influence the astate sector in this way mainly 
because of the political power they wield within the state and the status of 'statelessness' 
in the case of the plantation labour. But the latter is fast changing making the situation aven 
more complex. Plantation labour has emerged as a political force due to several recent 
changes. We shall now turn to look at that process in more detail. 
- lndian Tamils as a political force 
- Electoral politics 
The earlier analysis of plantation labour as a part of the astate system did not give much 
importance to them as a political force. This was mainly because of their lack of citizenship 
rights and voting rights. But this situation has changed significantly during the last decade. 
Three factors have contributed to this. These are a) Granting of citizenship rights to those 
sections of the lndian Tamil population remaining in Sri Lanka and their entry into electoral 
politics b) The strategic importance of lndian Tamils in a context of an aggravated ethnie 
conflict c) The impact of ethnie conflict on the political consciousness of this population. 
The Sirima-Shastri Pact which was an agreement between lndia and Sri Lanka was opposed 
by the Ceylon Workers Congress, the biggest trade union in the plantation sector and 
virtually the principle political representative of the lndian Tamil population. However later 
on the CWC concentrated on getting Sri Lankan citizenship to as many lndian Tamils as 
possible, and expediting this process once the Pact became a fact of life in the Sri Lankan 
polity. This process got a boost once the CWC joined the UNP government as a coalition 
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partner in 1977. One of the results of CWC agitation was the enactment of an Act called 
Grant of citizenship to Stateless Parsons Act No.5 of 1986 in February 1986 in order to 
grant Sri Lankan citizenship to a residual population of Indien Tamils whose fate was not 
decided by the Pact. The following figures give the situation regarding granting citizenship 
to these people at the time this Bill was brought to the parliament. 
(By 30th January 1986) 
(1) No. applied for Sri Lankan citizenship 625,000 
(2) No. to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship 375,000 
(3) No. granted citizenship 197 ,535 
(Natural increase granted 68,500) 
(4) No. awaiting grant of citizenship on a ratio 
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According to government sources this meant that there was a residual of 94,000 whose fate 
was not decided either way. This was because only 506,000 applied for lndian citizenship, 
although the lndian quota according to the 1964 agreement was 600,000, leaving a balance 
of 94,000. lt was to give these people Sri Lankan citizenship that a Bill was brought to the 
Parliament in January 1986. This meant a total of 469,000 people (375,000 + 94,000) and 
their natural increase was to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship. By 30th May 1987 the 
number that was granted Sri Lan kan citizenship was 209, 11 6 and their natural increase of 
77 ,393. By March 1988 this has increased approximately to 223,000. This meant another 
246,000 remained to be given Sri Lankan citizenship. 
The CWC continued its campaign to expedite the process of granting of citizenship aven 
after this Bill was enacted. According to this Bill which came into force on 18th February 
1986 the granting of citizenship should have been completed within a period of 18 months, 
i.e. by 18th August 1987. But as the figures show this did not happen. The CWC 29th 
annual convention which was held from 13th to 14th March 1987 took up this issue and 
adopted a resolution pointing out that a practical way of solving the issue is to grant Sri 
Lankan citizenship to all persons other than 506,000 who had applied for lndian citizenship 
and at the same time register them as voters. This was a demand to do away with the 
administrative process involved in registering citizens. The main objective of this demand 
was to try and get as many people as possible into the electoral registers. ln addition to 
putting forward this demand the convention also directed "The National and Executive 
Council (of the CWC) to call upon all Plantation workers to set a part 3 days from June 1 st 
June 3rd for the purpose of obtaining divine guidance to strengthen and assist the 
Government in realising its' avowed objective of registering all persons entitled to be citizens 
as voters without further delay." (28) This was the second CWC call for a prayer campaign 
within a short period of time. The CWC had used this effectively in one instance already. 
This time also as soon as the prayer campaign was announced the government appointed 
a Cabinet Sub-Committee to look into the problems regarding the registration of citizens. The 
Cabinet Sub- Committee met a CWC delegation headed by Mr. Thondaman on 1 st June 
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1987 and decided to take a test case of one large astate in order to identify the problems 
associated with granting of citizenship. 
Certainly there were many practical problems that had arisen because of the long delay 
associated with the implementation of the Sirima-Shastri pact. People had applied for 
citizenship of the two countries long ago. Since then many changes have taken place in the 
lives of these people. Soma have moved to different places of residence, soma have been 
affected by ethnie riots and soma have aven migrated to lndia in times of trouble. lt is in 
the context of this complicated situation that the CWC leadership put forward a new 
demand for overcoming the situation. The essence of this solution was to grant lndian 
citizenship to those who have migrated to lndia and wish to settle in lndia and "As against 
this Sri Lanka can register as Sri Lankan citizens all those now in the island, whether they 
are stateless, lndian citizens or prospective Sri Lankan citizens. This process can continue 
till Sri Lanka reaches its targeted figure of 469,000 and their natural increase.(29) 
Thondamen, the leader of the CWC put forward this idea during his visit to lndia in March 
1988 when he met the Prime Minister of lndia. lt was given wide publicity in lndia and there 
seem to be wide support to the idea in Tamil Nadu as well. 
This long struggle of the lndian Tamil population to win citizenship rights scored a significant 
gain at the end of 1988 when a new Act called Grant of Citizenship to stateless persons 
(Special Provisions) Act was enacted. This Act simplified the procedures for granting of Sri 
Lankan citizenship to those who were eligible for it. At the time of the enactment of this Act 
236,000 persons of lndian origin had been given Sri Lankan citizenship. This figure was 
given in the Act itself. This meant another 233,000 remained to be given the Sri Lankan. 
A direct result of people of lndian Tamil origin becoming citizens is that they become a 
political force in the areas they inhabit. Population-wise there are several electoral districts 
where there is a concentration of lndian Tamils. ln descending order of importance these are 
Nuwara Eliya (47.3%), Badulla (21.1 %), Vavuniya (19.4%), Mullativu (13.9%), Mannar( 
13.2%), Ratnapura (11.1 %), Kandy (9.3%), Matale (6.7%) and Kegalle(6.4%). These are 
figures from the 1981 Census. The actual proportion of lndian Tamils could be slightly higher 
than this because of the the already mentioned tendency of some sections of this population 
to respond to census enumeration as Sri Lankan Tamils once they have obtained their Sri 
Lankan citizenship. 
However the voting strength of this section of the population is much lower than what is 
indicated from the above figures of population proportions. There is still a large section of 
the lndian Tamil population who do not have citizenship rights and therefore the vote. " ln 
1976 when the number of lndian Tamils granted citizenship of Sri Lanka stood around 
220,000 those among them with voting rights accounted for 20% or more of the total 
number of registered voters in 22 electorates in the plantation areas of the Central 
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The total number of registered lndian Tamil voters at the time of the 1988 Presidential 
election was 356,000, which is about 3.8% of the total electorate. According to our 
estimates, at the time of this last Presidential and general elections there were three electoral 
districts ( Kandy, Badulla and Ratnapura) with a 45,000-50,000 concentration of lndian 
Tamils votes and one other (Nuwara Eliya) with about 54,000 votes. More than these 
absolute figures what is more important is the percentage- wise concentration of the vote. 
ln the case of lndian Tamils it is only in the Nuwara Eliya district there was enough 
concentration to elect a member from the community. Here about 24% of the registered 
vote is of an lndian Tamil ethnie character. However with the implementation of the new Bill 
this situation is bound to change. 
The political behaviour of this newly emerging lndian Tamil voter will be extremely important, 
specially for ethnie politics of the Central Province. The Provincial Council, Presidential and 
general elections showed soma of the emerging trends.The first round of Provincial Council 
elections saw the election of 1 5 members of lndian Tamil background as members to 
Provincial Councils. One more person had been appointed using the bonus seats. The 
following table gives the distribution of this membership. 
Table 10 
Central Province Uva Provincial Council 
7 CWC members 2 CWC members 
2 USA members 
1 UNP member (appointed) 
Sabaragamuwa Province Western Province 
1 CWC member 2 CWC members 
1 USA member 
12 of these 16 Provincial Council members of Indien Tamil background are CWC members, 
3 are from the USA and 1 from the UNP. The Central Province is the most important 
Province for the lndian Tamil population where they have ten Provincial Council members out 
of a total of 56. ln the new Provincial Council they had one Minister - S. Ramanathan, son 
of Thondaman who topped the preferential votes list in the Nuwara Eliya District with 
25,436 votes. 
ln the general elections, the CWC put forward candidates in seven electoral districts under 
the UNP ticket. These were Colombo, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Ratnapura, Kegalle, Kandy and 
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Matale. There were two more CWC candidates in the national list of UNP(31 ). Of these one 
was elected to parliament and two appointed through the national list. The elected member 
of the CWC, Sellasamy, was elected from the Colombo electoral district. Sellasamy was 
elected in Colombo not only because of the lndian Tamil vote. The proportion of the lndian 
Tamil vote is not high enough in Colombo to get a member elected even if all lndian Tamils 
vote for the CWC candidate. Sellasamy's appeal was wider. This shows a new dimension 
in the CWC politics. 
ln the case of other electoral districts it was the failure of CWC to get a person elected from 
the Nuwara Eliya electoral district that became a point of discussion in the analysis of 
general election results. The CWC spokesmen has attributed this to a failure of an electoral 
agreement with the UNP, lack of unity and needless infighting within the organisation. The 
CWC leadership came down strongly on party organisers because of this failure, but also 
carried out a reorganisation in party structures. ln the Nuwara Eliya electoral district the 
10,000 odd votes gained by DPLF was also a reason for the failure of the CWC. The DPLF 
had in its list a popular organiser of the CWC who was not given nomination in the CWC 
list for some reason or the other. This proved disadvantageous to the CWC. 
Apart from these reasons , there also seems to be other reasons arising from electoral 
behaviour of the lndian Tamil population for the outcome in the Nuwara Eliya district. For 
example, the highest number of preferences received by a CWC candidate in Nuwara Eliya 
was 23,882. This is close to 25,436 - which was the highest figure obtained by a CWC 
candidate during Provincial Council elections. However both these figures are way below our 
estimate of 54,000 votes among the lndian Tamil population in the Nuwara Eliya electoral 
district. This gap between the available voting strength of lndian Tamils and the preferences 
received by the CWC is observed in other electoral districts as well. This was the most 
important reason why a CWC candidate was not elected from Nuwara Eliya electoral district. 
There can be many factors explaining this discrepancy. Probably the answer is a combination 
of these. Sorne of the possible reasons are 
- Due to several reasons the voter turnout rate among the lndian Tamil population is still low. 
Franchise is certainly a very new experience for a large number of lndian Tamil voters. This 
lack of experience in participating in elections, arrangements of the polling booths and the 
distances that have to be travelled to vote, can lead to a low turnout. Even the very tact 
that the CWC is not contesting independently can be one of the reasons for the low turn 
out. If the appeal of the CWC is mainly ethnie, its loss of identity by contesting under the 
UNP ticket can reduce the enthusiasm of the voter to corne out and vote. 
- Not all lndian Tamil voters vote with the CWC as it had happened in the Nuwara Eliya 
district this time. 
- Not all lndian Tamil voters had cast their preferences. For example DPLF has received 
10,509 votes. But even if all the preferences that DPLF members received came from 
separate individual voters, only about 3000 of them have cast their preferences. 
Given these realities of the present strength of the lndian Tamil vote it is easy to understand 
the present strategy of CWC in not going alone to the elections, but contesting on the UNP 
ticket. The fact of the matter is, because of statelessness, there is still a large section of the 
lndian Tamil population without voting rights. Even in the 1977 the general elections, the 
CWC managed to get only one member elected from Nuwara Eliya/Maskeliya electorate. This 
was a multi-member constituency with three members and each voter having three votes. 
Even then Mr. Thondamen was elected as the third member. However the situation is bound 
to change with implementation of the Citizenship Act enacted in November 1988. By the 
next elections the voting strength of the lndian Tamil community will increase significantly. 
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Despite the tact that the CWC could get only one member elected to parliament, they have 
three members altogether, two being appointed through the national list. What is more, all 
these three members hold portfolios in the present government (one Minister ,two Ministers 
of State) This shows the importance given by the UNP to this alliance with the CWC. 
Certainly by the time of the next elections, with most of the people of lndian Tamil origin 
getting citizenship, the importance of the CWC in the political arena will grow. 
- Plantation labour as a working class 
The political strength of the lndian Tamil voter will not only depend on their voting strength, 
although this is bound to increase with more and more of them getting Sri Lankan 
citizenship. The lndian Tamil labour is also the most numerous workforce in the all important 
plantation sector. This sector is still important in our economy. This labour force is highly 
unionised and has a long history of trade union struggles. Table 11 shows the strikes in the 
plantation sector since 1977. The main unions in the plantation sector and their political 
affiliations are given in Table 12. 
Table 11 
Strikes in the plantation sector 
Year No. of Workers Man-days 
strikes involved lost 
1977 88 33586 188271 
1978 118 56707 248573 
1979 163 50969 238147 
1980 202 75130 301671 
1981 297 215072 455312 
1982 188 74720 323440 
1983 136 49863 204226 
1984 213 79025 383640 
Source: Statistical Abstracts 1985 - Department of Census and Statistics 
Table 12 
Name of Union 
Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) 
Lanka Jathika Estates Union (LJEW) 
National Union of Workers (NUW) 
Ceylon Plantation Workers Union (CPWU) 
Lanka Estate Workers Union 
United Plantation Workers Union (UPWU) 
Democratic Workers Union (DWC) 
New Red Flag Workers Union (NRFWU) 









Although there was a semblance of industrial peace, specially after the government managed 
to crush the General strike of 1980, the available data shows that industrial action has been 
a common thing in the plantation sector. Most of these strikes are concerned with very 
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specific issues regarding living and working conditions. Vary often these strikes are confined 
to few astates or sometimes a single astate. However the cumulative picture is significant. 
lt shows the prevalent of trade union traditions in the plantation sector. The statistics also 
show the sharp increase in the number of strikes in 1981. Perhaps this is related to the 
ethnie violence that affected the astate sector at that time. This was the first large scale 
attack on lndian Tamil labour during recent times. 
Of the unions in the plantation sector the CWC and LJEW are the main ones having the 
largest number in terms of membership. NUW,UPWU,DWC and NRFU are the other unions 
showing a presence of any significant degree. The USA members from the lndian Tamil 
background elected as Provincial Council members are activists from soma of these other 
unions. With long established trade unions, organised working class action has been a 
common feature in the plantation sector. 
During the last decade at least two of the plantation unions have become powerful 
organisations. These are the CWC and the LJEW. Their own strength and also access to 
state patronage have been the most important reasons for this. This growth has certainly 
enhanced the capacity of these organisations to put pressure on the government and win 
certain demands for the benefit of the plantation workers. They have certainly achieved 
significant successes in winning concessions within the existing framework. 
However as pointed out by several authors (32),(33) these established powerful unions have 
also become much more linked to the 'system' and their capacity to respond to the growing 
political consciousness of the lndian Tamil labour can be in question. One basic reason for 
this is of course the close link of these unions to the ruling group. Whatever concessions 
one might win with this arrangement, such a position when maintained for many years 
develops many structural links with the establishment which can make it difficult for the 
organisation to go beyond a particular framework. Unions too are hierarchichal internally, 
reflecting internai social differentiation with in the lndian Tamil population. They have 
developed a cadre for whom the organisation is a means of social mobility and a means of 
access to state patronage and resources of various kind. Such a cadre might be more 
interested in keeping the structural linkages with the establishment that allows them to keep 
their positions rather than responding to radicalising tendencies in political consciousness. 
The more radical tendencies in political consciousness among the plantation labour is linked 
to their ethnie consciousness and to the accentuation of ethnie identities in the present 
historical context of Sri Lanka. lt is not that ethnie identity is absent even during trade union 
struggles of the plantation labour. ln tact it is the appeal of the ethnie identity that allows 
the plantation labour to coma together in working class struggles when different unions 
present in the plantations cannot agree on certain struggles because of their varying political 
affiliations. This was demonstrated during the 1984 wage struggle. However the ethnie 
consciousness seem to be evolving into a qualitatively new stage due to recent 
developments. lt is the capacity of the established unions to respond to the radicalisation 
coming from this that is in question. 
Security of Plantation labour, Ethnie consciousness and political violence 
The lndian Tamils who lived largely in the astates had a permanency of residence in the 
astates where they lived as long as they had employment in the plantations. They are the 
only ethnie group in Sri Lanka in such a situation. Therefore loss of employment in the 
estates will also mean that they will be uprooted from the places where they have been 
resident up to now. The sa me is achieved by the reduction of the land available for the 
plantation sector. ln other words the encroachments into astate sector by 'outside forces' 
have far reaching implications for the lndian Tamil population. lt basically affects their 
security of residence and their ability to reside in places where they have lived for 
generations. Thus it becomes a basic issue of security of an ethnie group. 
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The sensitivity of this issue came to light in the recent controversy over settlement of 
earthslip victims in Kotmale on land taken over from astates. The CWC was quick to react 
against any attempt to settle people in astate land amidst plantation population. The issue 
led to differences of opinion in the cabinet between Thondaman and Gamini 
Dissanayake.-(34) 
The demand put forward by the CWC to vest the ownership of the line rooms in the people 
who had lived in them for a long time can be seen as a move to ensure the permanency of 
residence of the plantation people in the area where they live. If the houses and the plot of 
land surrounding them are vested with the plantation workers their residence in the astate 
area will no longer be conditional on employment in the astates. This demand was put 
forward during the 25th convention of the CWC held in Kandy in February 1976. This was 
reiterated during the 29th convention which was held in 1987 .(35) The chief guest of this 
session was Mr. J.R.Jayewardene, former President. Further representation were made by 
the CWC to Mr. Premadasa, who succeeded Mr. Jayawardene as the leader of the UNP. 
What is important to note is that the implications of this process are far wider than the 
'extent' to which this 'encroachment of outside forces' has taken place to the detriment 
of the interests of lndian Tamil plantation labour. Sorne of the more empiricist analysis of 
this question tries to take comfort by arguing that these tendencies are not of a significant 
scale. For example it has been pointed out that 'in the main tea plantation districts of the 
country (Nuwara Eliya and Badulla which in 1981 accounted for 52% of the total astate 
population in Sri Lanka) the intercensal decline in the extent of land covered by astates was 
only about 18%' (36). However insignificant the extent might be, it signifies a process that 
has all the elements that can contribute to a new phase of the ethnie conflict. 
There are two contending ethnie groups in this conflict- one with a historical grievance 
regarding land taken over from them and the other having fears about permanency of 
residence in the areas where they live at present due to what they perceive as entry of 
'outsiders'. This could easily take the character of another conflict for land and permanency 
of residence in another part of the country fuelled by ethnie ideologies. 
This is not an argument for restricting the employment or land in the astate sector solely for 
lndian Tamil plantation labour. Social changes within this population itself will push them out 
of this sector. There are signs of this process already visible. But the objective here is to 
point out the contradictions generated by the state take over of plantations and opening of 
the plantations to 'outside' forces that accompanied it. What we are trying to show is that 
the influences of these forces has a potentiality to generate a conflict that will be disastrous 
in the context of the ethnie conflict prevailing in our society today. lt also questions the 
seemingly 'progressive' arguments that were put forward to justify state take over of 
plantations. lt is more a part of the expansion of the state capitalist sector supported by 
nationalist forces as well. lts impact on plantation labour shows all the contradictions 
associated with such a step. 
These changes are now happening in a context where the ethnie conflict has become a 
major contradiction in our society. This has influenced the political consciousness of the 
plantation labour. The ethnie conflict reached the high point that we see today because of 
the grievances of Sri Lankan Tamils. Although there are identity differences between the 
latter and the lndian Tamils any further aggravation of the conflict can very easily engulf the 
lndian Tamils as well. If this happens the instability will spread to the central part of the 
country and into an important sector of our economy. This gives a strategic importance to 
the plantation labour. 
ln the earlier section we discussed the takeover of astates as a form of entry of 'outside 
forces' into the plantation sector with the intervention of the state. As already mentioned 
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this process was also marked by certain violent incidents in which the astate population 
was thrown out of the astates. Since then the astate sector has not been spared in the 
general escalation of violent processes that had characterised the Sri Lankan polity in recent 
times. The astate population were victims of pogroms in 1977, 1981 and 1983. Such 
incidents would have displaced some sections of the lndian Tamil population permanently 
from the astate sector. They have motivated some others to opt for lndian citizenship or to 
move into more safe areas. However the situation seem to show new tendencies in more 
recent times . The astate population has begun to resist violence against them using more 
militant forms of action. This tendency came into the news in early 1986 in certain parts of 
the hill country when astate people resisted violence against them. Such developments are 
important indicators of future political tendencies in plantations if problems are not resolved 
in time. As we have already mentioned the growth of these violent processes has 
contributed to making the Central Province an ethnically segregated area. lt is in such an 
area that any further aggravation of conflict will occur. 
Ethnie segregation of the Province on one hand and the possibility of access to land and the 
question of permanency of residence becoming a major controversy is a very good basis for 
ethnie politics to develop. This has developed the ground for the entry of several Tamil 
militant groups into the plantation areas and also for a more militant articulation of lndian 
Tamil Ethno- nationalism. 
Of the Northern militant groups EROS had a political position that gave importance to 
plantation labour right from the beginning. ENDLF, EPRLF and the PFL T, which is the political 
party launched by PLOTE have also interest in working in the plantation areas. PFL T offered 
its ticket to Chandesegaram during the last general election. He has been a long time worker 
for the CWC but later broke away from the latter. The Up Country People's Front is a new 
and more militant organisation that has emerged in plantation areas under the leadership of 
Chandrasegaram. The leadership of this organisation is primarily from plantation areas. 
These developments brings in development of plantation politics to a qualitatively a new 
stage. On one hand a more radical leadership is emerging from the plantation background. 
Secondly as shown by documents put out by these organisations there are new concerns 
about such issues like the security of residence in the areas where plantation people have 
lived for such a long time and political power in these areas within a framework of 
devolution of power. 
ln addition to the traditional issues the new militancy in the plantation sector differs because 
it is now articulated in association with growing identity of an ethnie nature. These new 
assertions of identity reject the use of the term 'lndian Tamils' with good reasons. 
Historically the second class status of this population was closely linked with this prefix 
lndian. With the granting of Sri Lankan citizenship there is an attempt by politically 
articulated sections of this population to identify themselves as 'Hill country Tamils'. This 
on one hand removes the lndian connections and on the other hand gives them an identity 
distinct from other Tamil speaking ethnie groups in Sri Lanka. 
The dynamism of this new identity is also linked to a desire for a permanent home or a place 
of residence. Most of the more militant political groups see the Nuwara Eliya district where 
there is a concentration of this population as such an area. Hence the demand for a certain 
degree of autonomy for this district within a framework of Provincial Councils. Socio-
economically we can link these tendencies with the sense of insecurity that the plantation 
people are facing as a result of the demands on estate land which we have already 
discussed. 
lt might be certainly true that the influence of these more militant organisations expressing 
a more radical form of ideology is still small and insignificant. However there are several 
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reasons to believe that it will grow in the future. The first reason is of course the possible 
deteoration of objective conditions in these areas introducing new issues like access to land 
as a base for conflict. This we have discussed in the earlier sections of this paper. Secondly, 
due to a certain degree of social mobility plantation people do have a younger leadership 
who have soma level of education and are able to articulate the political needs of this 
population in radical terms. Their numbers might be small absolutely, as well as in 
percentage terms. However their ideologies are different and they might not be so amenable 
to coalition politics with the established parties, in the same way as the CWC. The 
experience of other countries as well as the experience in Sri Lanka among the other ethnie 
groups show the key role played by such group. Soma of them have already faced state 
repression and have suffered at the hands of Sinhala chauvinism. There is a significant 
number of people of the lndian Tamil background in the Northern Province, specially in the 
Vavuniya district. They have been in the middle of the ethnie conflict. Thus plantation areas 
have both objective and subjective factors that can help to develop a more militant form of 
eth no-nationalism. 
The militancy affecting plantation areas took a new turn recently with the emergence of the 
issue of repatriation of lndian passport holders. The number is estimated to be around 
100000. While the Sri Lankan government is keen to restart the repatriation process, the 
more militant sections of the lndian Tamil political spectrum are opposing it. ln addition to 
the above mentioned Tamil militant groups, the L TTE has also joined the agitation for this 
cause. With the latter's dominant position in the North and East, they will be able to bring 
much more pressure on the government on this question. lt is clear that the repatriation of 
the lndian passport holders has become a critical issue in plantation politics. The sensitivity 
of the issue is such that aven the more moderate organisations like the CWC will have to 
take up this question. 
The Kandyan peasantry 
The Central Province is also the home of the Kandyan Sinhalese with a specific regional 
identity which is closely linked to land. Kandyan Sinhalese of the Central Province also have 
grievances over land due to development during the colonial period. lt is based on land being 
taken away from them for the establishment of plantations. Whatever may be the empirical 
basis of this claim, the important issue is the ideological element behind this. Ali the 
elements that go to make land as a base for ethnie conflicts are found in this grievance. 
While the historical grievances over land can provide an ideological base for a future conflict, 
what is also important are the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the rural areas of the 
Central Province. Tables 13 and 14 summarises soma of the available socio-economic data 
for the three districts. 
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Table 13 
Occupation structure - Central Province 
(% of employed population) 
Administrative & managerial 
Professional,technical & 
related 
Clerical and related workers 
Sales workers 
Service workers 
Agricultural, animal husbandry 
& forestry workers 
Production & related workers 
transport equipment operators 






























Based on these data the principle socio-economic characteristics of the three districts which 
comprise the Central Province can be summarised as follows; 
Matale - The Dry Zone district of Matale has more land, and land holdings are relatively 
larger. Agricultural development can take place with the provision of facilities like irrigation. 
However being situated near densely populated wet zone districts like Kandy where land 
holding sizes are smaller, the land in this area cornes under pressure due to migration of 
population . Any development of productive forces in agriculture is bound to be accompanied 
with processes leading to social polarisation and loss of land from the small peasantry as it 
has happened in other dry zone agricultural districts. Therefore aven if the agriculture in 
these areas presents soma hope, it will simultaneously generate social contradictions. 
The District is relatively less urbanised and a larger proportion of the population depend on 
agriculture as the main means of livelihood. Like the other districts of the Province almost 
half the operators in paddy do not own land. Bulk of the cultivation is on a subsistance and 
depend on family labour. 
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Table 14 
Agricultural population - Central Province 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya 
% of agricultural household 
population to total population 54.6 74.8 34.0 
% of agricultural operators whose 
60.1 occupation is only agriculture 43.4 61.6 
Area operated by the above category 59.8 74.5 74.3 
% of operators owning paddy holdings 54.9 56.7 50.2 
% of paddy holdings < 1 Acre 64.4 46.5 59.2 
% holdings where entire work 
is done by household members 75.6 84.3 62.9 
Area covered by the above category 61.7 75.0 56.3 
% of holdings producing mainly 
for home consumption 67.5 77.7 57.1 
Area covered by the above category 50.9 65.6 55.0 
Source : Agricultural Census 1982 
Kandy - Kandy is the more urbanised district and the occupation pattern shows a larger 
share of the population depending on non- agricultural means of livelihood. Still close to hait 
the population of the district falls into the category of Agricultural households. The holding 
sizes in agriculture are relatively smaller compared to holding sizes in the adjoining Matale 
district. Cultivation is of a subsistance nature and aven if there is any growth in agriculture 
it will benefit more the people having relatively large plots. For the majority of population in 
these parts the future lies in various forms of wage labour either in the agricultural or 
non-agricultural sectors. The pressure for jobs and land in the plantation sector emanates 
largely from this district. lt is more densely populated. 
Nuwara Eliya - ln the Nuwara Eliya district around 34% of the population fall into agricultural 
households occupied in small holder agriculture. Agriculture has characteristics similar to 
that in Kandy district being based on very small holdings and cultivation of a subsistance 
nature with family labour. ln addition small holder agriculture here faces lots of 
disadvantages because of being hemmed in by plantations. This gives no room for 
expansion. 
Writing in 1951, the Report of the Kandyan Peasantry Commission, noted the following with 
regard to the conditions of the rural population in Kandyan areas. " The pressure on land, 
aggravated by the growth of population has placed an intolerable burden on the village 
household. There are more mouths to feed, but no land to cultivate and no housing 
accomodation. Apart from low levels of living standards and insanitary houses ... which must 
necessarily reflect adversely on moral and social standards, the want of food and 
employment has led the village population to seek any possible method of escape ... " (37) 
Later studies(38) have noted the aggravation of these socio- economic problems and high 
level of politicisation of rural areas in general and prevalence of similar situations in Kandyan 
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areas. The major tendencies and the contributory factors responsible for the worsening of 
the socio-economic conditions of the rural population over the years are: 
- The growth of the population and the concomitant fragmentation of agricultural land 
especially in the wet zone and the emergence of a sizeable landless population; 
- The decline of the importance of paddy and the growing importance of cash crops as a 
source of agricultural income, especially in the wet zone; 
-The increasing dependence on various forms of wage labour including wage labour outside 
paddy cultivation as a means of livelihood 
- Development of capitalist relations in the countryside coupled with social polarisations that 
goes along with it; 
- The high level of politicisation and influence of politics in general, in the affairs of the rural 
society. 
Similar processes characterise the rural sector of the Central Province as well. This is the 
basis for the pressures on the plantation sector to act as an employment generator for the 
rural population as well as to provide land for the purpose of easing the landlessness 
situation. However it is extremely difficult to expect the plantation sector to yield to these 
pressures and remain viable. Overstaffing and high proportion of the cost of labour leading 
to high production costs are the main factors reducing the profit margins and viability of the 
plantation sector. Therefore the capacity of the plantation sector to be a source of 
employment is limited. Similarly there cannot be further reduction of land coming under 
plantations without seriously affecting the industry as well as creating further complications 
in ethnie relations. Both these tendencies tend to go against the interests of the plantation 
labour. 
Regional Sinhala alite 
The emerging political tendencies among the Sinhalese of the Central Province can be 
considered under two headings; 1 ) the politics of the regional Sinhala alite that articulates 
themselves through electoral politics. This electoral politics now operate at two levels -
national and provincial. 2) the more militant and violent form nationalist politics represented 
by organisations like Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna as a political force among the Sinhalese. 
Apart from the dynamics of ethnie politics the demand for the Centre to give up soma of 
its controls also cornes from the traditional political leadership that emerges from the 
periphery through the electoral process. ln the case of Sri Lanka this is mainly reflected in 
the attempts by politicians at the periphery to gain control over the development 
programmes carried out in the areas where they corne from. This has been noted by soma 
of the studies done on decentralisation and devolution from an administrative perspective. 
Wanasinghe(39) for example characterised decentralisation programmes as evolving through 
three phases. "The first phase from 1965 to 1970, was characterised by attempts to 
decentralise the implementation(?) decision making, whilst locating co-ordination of 
development activities to the district level. The second phase saw two basic policy thrusts. 
One was a move to provide political content to the decentralise co-ordination system. 
Another was to strengthen the decentralised system by providing it with financial resources 
through the introduction of a decentralised budget. The third phase, which is still in its 
evolutionary phase, has sought to consolidate the political control over the decentralised 
system as well as to explore ways and means of involving people more directly in the 
decentralised system." lt is this last phase according to this analysis that has evolved now 
to establish structures with legislative powers at the periphery. Thus these earlier exercises 
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in decentralisation has been accompanied by a struggle of the politicians at the periphery not 
only to get a certain degree independence from the centre, but also to assert their authority 
over the administrative structures at the peripheral level. 
Although the phenomenon of the presence and assertion of regional politics had been noted 
in soma of these analyses of decentralisation others have ignored this by analysing it as 
'political inteference'. However this is to miss the main point by making politics soma sort 
of an 'external' factor. Generally politics is not something that 'interferes' from outside but 
is a dimension that is always there. What is needed is a deeper understanding of the social 
processes that generate regional politics. 
Such an analysis should throw more light on the contradictions between the interests of this 
newly emerging political leadership at the periphery and the interests of the centre. ln the 
case of the Central Province this is important because of the presence of a regional identity 
- Kandyan Sinhalese in the Central Province. Historically Kandyan Sinhalese have expressed 
their interests and demands as a separate group. However since independence there had 
been a process through which a single Sinhala identity had emerged. The ability of the 
political parties that ruled the centre to incorporate the interests of all Sinhalese had been 
an important factor in this . ln other words the post-independence political formations of Sri 
Lanka had the ability to cross the identity barriers between low country and up country 
Sinhalese. This is precisely what has not happened in the case of soma minority ethnie 
groups(Sri Lankan Tamils and lndian Tamils) or might have happened inadequately in the 
case of others(Muslims). 
However the future of political articulation at the regional level poses many interesting 
questions. Regional autonomies do have the possibility of strenghthening regional identities. 
Especially with a regional identity that has a long history politics of the Sinhalese in the 
Central Province can lead to a rearticulation of the Kandyan Sinhalese identity and interests 
in a new form. There is very room for this if the contradictions between regional and central 
interests are not resolved amicably or if the socio-economic contradictions affecting the 
region deepen. 
Finally the present political crisis in Sri Lanka has given rise to a more militant form of 
politics that uses extra-parliamentary methods and violence in order to achieve the political 
ends. lt already has a history extending to several years. Central Province was also affected 
very much by this form of politics. Available sets of data such as monthly data presented 
to the parliament during emergency debates shows that Matale and Kandy are two districts 
affected very much by the insurgent violence of 1988 and 1989. The same is indirectly 
confirmed by the low voter turn rates in these districts during the Presidential and General 
elections of December 1988 and February 1989. 
Ethnie politics and the Muslim population 
Muslims form the second most important ethnie minority within the Central Province. They 
form 7 .3 per cent of the Provincial population. District wise they have a ten percent share 
of the population in the Kandy district and 7 per cent in the Matale district. As shown by 
the data from the last islandwide census the level of urbanisation of the Muslim population 
is high. According to this census 42. 7% of the Muslims lived in urban areas whereas the 
national average was 21.5%. Districts like Colombo, Galle and Kalutara have 99%, 72% and 
72% of its Muslim population classified as urban. 
Compared to this the proportion of urban population in the Central Province is lower. Table 




Kandy Mata le Eliya C.P. 
Total Muslim pop. 112052 25836 14668 152556 
Total urban pop. 24336 8360 3422 36118 
Percentage 21.7 32.4 23.3 23.7 
This probably reflects the history of the settlement of Muslim population in the Kandy 
district, where the bulk of the Muslim population of the province is found. Muslims in this 
district settled during the period of the Kandyan Kingdom and they have integrated 
themselves well into the rural society. This results in a relatively large percentage of a rural 
Muslim population in the Kandy district. ln contrast to this, in districts like Galle and 
Colombo where the settlement of the Muslim population was linked to trade one finds a 
greater concentration of this ethnie group in the urban centres. 
As far as recent political tendencies are concerned an important development has been the 
emergence of separate Muslim political parties. There are now two political parties identified 
as Muslim political parties. These are the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress(SLMC) and the Muslim 
United Liberation Front. Although both these are recognised as phenomena that originated 
from the Eastern Province, and therefore reflect the developments in that area, their 
emergence is nevertheless significant. lt is a departure from the hitherto prevalent Muslim 
practice of expressing themselves politically by being members of one of the major political 
parties. This desire for a separate Muslim political party seem to have soma support in areas 
other than the East. For example a sample survey done during a recent study(40) showed 
that only about 14 per cent of the sample questioned in the Central Province did not want 
a separate Muslim party and also thought it would not benefit the Muslims. Close to 29 per 
cent on the other hand wanted one and a similar proportion thought that it was not feasible 
or did not have any comments. What is important to note here is the proportion that did not 
want a separate party and thought that it would not benefit Muslims was small. 
There are similarities in the way a new leadership emerged among Sri Lankan Tamils and 
Muslims. ln both ethnie groups the aggravation of the ethnie conflict resulted in the 
emergence of a leadership based in ragions where there was a concentration of these ethnie 
groups. ln other words it was a shift away from a leadership based in areas closer to the 
Centre. The latter, because of their own interests, could go into accommodative politics with 
majority parties. However with the aggravation of ethnie contradictions this arrangement no 
longer worked. The emergence of regional ethnie parties also meant radicalisation of 
demands as well. ln the case of Sri Lankan Tamils this shift in the leadership is now total. 
With Muslims it has meant an introduction of a new element into Muslim politics in the form 
of the Muslim Congress. 
The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress made its debut in electoral politics during the Provincial 
Council elections. ln the Central Province they managed to get two members elected from 
the Kandy district and one member from the Matale district. Two other Muslim members had 
been elected through the UNP ticket in the Kandy district. 




Performance of SLMC 




































As shown above the SLMC put forward candidates in 13 electoral districts out of 22. 
Although there is a significant concentration of Muslims in the Matale district the SLMC did 
not put forward any candidates there .By contesting in these 13 electoral districts the SLMC 
obtained a total of 202,877 (3.61 % of total valid votes) votes in the country. Approximately 
this is about one third of Muslim votes in the country.Voting patterns in general shows that 
the strength of SLMC is mainly in Mannar district of the Northern Province (5.8% of the 
Provincial vote) and in the Eastern Province (24. 7% of the Provincial vote). 
Part IV - Ethnie conflict, political violence and Provincial Councils 
The establishment of Provincial Councils enjoying a degree of devolved power is certainly 
a significant development in the political evolution of Sri Lanka. lt creates legislative bodies 
at Provincial level capable of addressing issues in the Provinces. 
As we have already discussed the Provincial Council of the Central Province will actually 
have within it three identifiable ethno-social groups. These are lndian Tamils working largely 
in the astate sector; Sinhalese a large section of whom is from peasant background; and 
Muslims found both in villages and cities. These ethno-social groups exist in a context of 
emerging politicised forms of minority ethnie identities and in an atmosphere of large scale 
violence associated with politics. 
ln such a context Provincial Council has to be viewed as an arena or an institution mediating 
between these contradictory processes. Therefore any study of Provincial Councils has to 
focus on their capacity to mediate these conflicts or to act as a conflict management 
institution. Looking at Provincial Councils as a conflict management institution is quite 
different from the way such institutions had been analysed in the administrative approaches. 
For the latter these are 'independent' structures that were put in place to achieve certain 
objectives. When these objectives are not achieved very often the failure is blamed on 
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certain 'factors'. ln the conflict management approach they are not in any way inde pendent 
institutions that arise in the mind of the planners or politicians, but they are products of a 
conflict process in society. Then they continue to exist in a context that is characterised by 
the social processes which are conflictual. ln such an approach their effectiveness is 
measured by their capacity to mediate in the conflict and manage it. 
ln analysing the role of Provincial Councils with the above perspective one can note two 
dimensions - political and socio- economic. ln the case of the first the question is whether 
the Provincial Councils will succeed as an arena for managing the conflicts at a political 
level. The second issue is related to the capacity of Provincial Councils to intervene in the 
socio- economic sphere so as to mitigate the contradictions emerging in this sphere. 
Provincial Councils introduce a new forum for the manifestation of political interests that can 
be expressed through the electoral process. Provincial Councils could also be a useful 
mechanism for incorporating newly emerging social groups into the political sphere. This 
could be already happening through different political parties to a certain extent. Therefore 
theoretically it could be used to bring out political interests at the provincial level. However 
its specific management capabilities will depend on the type of political issues that will 
dominate in the area. 
At the political level Provincial Councils can also become an arena for political management 
giving room for coalition politics between political parties representing different ethnie 
groups. For example at present the Provincial Council of the Central Province is not only an 
arena for the expression of the political will of the plantation people but it has also become 
a forum for coalition politics between the UNP and the CWC. This coalition arrangement 
between these two parties has played an important role in managing the ethnie relations 
with respect to the lndian Tamil community. There are certainly tensions in this arrangement, 
but it has worked for some time and the politics of the Central Province Provincial councils 
will become a crucial arena for this management politics. 
Provincial Councils also provides a new arena for the expression of various political interests. 
Hitherto political interests were primarily expressed through the central legislature. Provincial 
Councils introduces a new platform for politics. This of course poses a host of interesting 
questions. How will the existing political forces make use of Provincial Councils?, Will 
Provincial Councils motivate new forms of political expressions?, etc .. 
Answers that could be given to these questions at present is largely of a speculative nature. 
However certain tendencies have soma degree probability. As we have already mentioned 
one of them is expression of regional political interests through Provincial Councils. Kandyan 
Sinhalese political interests as well as lndian Tamil political interests are prime candidates 
for this. Central Province is the only area in the country where these specific political 
identities could be expressed. Therefore it is quite possible that Provincial Council of Central 
Province will be a platform for these identities. The political interaction between the Centre 
and the Provincial Council of the Central Province can get dominated by this contradiction. 
Such contradictions will form the second set of issues for political management that arises 
with the establishment of Provincial Councils. 
Although we can keep some degree of hope on the Provincial Councils as a mechanism of 
conflict management in the political arena it is extremely difficult to expect such a capability 
in the socio-economic sphere. The capacity of the Provincial Council to intervene in the 
socio-economic sphere will depend very much on the extent to which the Council has a 
control over the development policies and can influence the development modal. At present 
this seems to be very difficult due to main two main reasons. On one hand the degree of 
devolution envisaged in the proposed system for Sri Lanka is such that the Provincial 
Councils will not be controlling much of the development programmes in the Province. 
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Secondly the general tendency of the development modal followed is towards central 
control. 
The socio-economic problems of the major ethno-social groups in the Central Province are 
a part and parcel of general socio- economic problems faced by the entire society. lt is 
unlikely that the Provincial Council system can make much of dent in the highly centralised 
economy of Sri Lanka so as to have a capacity to tackle problems at the socio-economic 
level. 
The situation in the Central Province is also complicated by the particular socio-economic 
setting in this area which links the major ethnie groups that constitute the Province to 
distinct socio-economic systems. From the ethno-social groups the bulk of the lndian Tamils 
of the Province are attached to production system that is controlled from the Centre. Being 
a resident labour force, the problems regarding their living conditions are also linked to the 
estate and therefore cornes under the purview of the Central government. On the other hand 
there are many problems of the Sinhala peasantry that will corne under the power given to 
the Provincial Councils. ln other words these ethno- social group who are already divided 
historically due to many factors will now corne under two different political authorities. 
The estate based living conditions of the lndian Tamil labour makes it difficult for the 
Provincial Council to intervene in their socio-economic problems. On the other hand the PC 
of the Central Province has become important for the expression of the political power of 
the lndian Tamil population who are gaining citizenship rights and the voting rights. Today 
it is in this body that one finds the biggest concentration of representatives of the lndian 
Tamil people and it is a useful mechanisms for the expression of their political will. That 
means as far as the lndian Tamil population is concerned the legislative body where they 
have some degree of political power will find it difficult to influence the socio-economic 
conditions of its constitue ne y. Provincial Council of the Central Province will have to resolve 
this contradiction in future. 
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POLITICS OF EDUCATION AND PROBLEMS 
OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN 
PROVINCIAL COUNCILS 
A case study of Central Province 
This is the second part of the a two part report devoted to a study of the problems faced 
by the newly established Provincial Council in the area of education. This report consist of 
six sections. The first section looks at politics of education focusing on the crucial role 
played by education as a means of social mobility. This is followed by a survey of main 
developments in education since 1977 and a look at the educational problems of the Central 
Province of Sri Lanka. The fourth section traces the establishment and changes brought by 
the Provincial councils within this context. The final section summarises the conclusions 
from the study and ends up with some policy recommandations in the light of the 
conclusions. 
Politics of Education and Social Mobility 
The first Part of this study was based on the centrality of politics in the study of policy 
issues facing the newly established Provincial Councils(PCs). On the basis of a study of 
ethno-political processes, this part emphasised the need to keep politics in focus when 
studying policy issues faced by PCs. The study advocated this in contrast to a pure 
administrative approach in the analysis of polie y problems f acing PCs. 
Keeping with this perspective we shall now proceed to look at the policy problems faced by 
the Provincial Council of Central Province in the area of education. ln order to do this we will 
have to discuss briefly the political dimensions of education in Sri Lanka and the relevance 
of politics of education in the ongoing conflict faced by the Sri Lanka which has both a 
social and an ethnie dimension. 
Education has always been a very sensitive political issue. lt is able to mobilise people and 
any changes in the educational policies generate widespread discussion. This political 
sensitivity of education has a social dimension as well as an ethnie dimension. The principle 
reason behind this political sensitivity towards education is the crucial role played by 
education in our society as a means of social mobility. Education has been an avenue that 
has opened up opportunities for a wider section of the population. Due to some of the policy 
changes in education in the past it has actually opened up opportunities to a wider section 
of the population. Therefore there are high expectations from the investment made in 
education. 
An understanding of this crucial role of education as a means of social mobility is extremely 
important in order to comprehend the enthusiasm and mobilisation that the questions related 
to education and educational reforms can have in Sri Lanka. Probably in this country there 
are very few other spheres of activity which can create an island-wide discussion and public 
interest like education. This was demonstrated aven in recent times, for example when the 
White Paper on Education was introduced into public discussion in 1981 . 
Such a role has been entrusted to education partly because of the particular pattern of Sri 
Lanka's development pattern. The development process introduced from the colonial period 
did not give opportunities to many people in the sectors of the economy that were given 
priority. The plantation agriculture was based mainly on migrant labour and did not open 
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avenues for many. There was hardly any industrial development to talk of. On the other 
hand the agriculture, specially that of the wet zone, with land holdings that got divided into 
smaller and smaller plots from generation to generation did not hold out much hope. And it 
was in this region that a large section of the population continued to live. Even the 'Green 
Revolution' strategies introduced on a wide scale in the mid-sixties, did not bring about 
significant changes as far as the wet zone agriculture is concerned. This lack of devel-
opment of productive forces in many sectors of the economy moved the population more 
and more towards education, qualifications and examination success and then in most cases 
towards employment in the state sector, as the principle hope for social mobility. This 
happened both in the Northern and Southern parts of the country. Districts of Jaffna and 
Matara are two examples of areas where small holder agriculture did not hold out much hope 
and education was seen as a major avenue for social mobility. These are also districts that 
show large out-migration rates because of people looking for avenues of livelihood outside 
agriculture in their traditional places of residence. Thus this process affected Tamils in the 
North as well as the Sinhalese in the south. 
Thus the role of education as a principle means of social mobility has a reason in the 
structural characteristics of our socio-economic system .. Therefore the demands for 
expansion of education has an objective socio-economic base and the persistance of this 
condition is a strong reason people are sensitive about changes in educational policies. 
The objective socio-economic situation and the role given by it to education creates 
conditions for a very widespread popular appeal for demands such as expansion of 
opportunities in education. lt finds a ready response in large section of the population, who 
have no other means for social mobility. Vary often this drive towards educational 
opportunities which is first of all a result of objective socio-economic condition in which 
people live, can acquire characteristics of a strong ideology where sending your children to 
schools and attempting to give them an education while undergoing all kinds of difficulties 
on the part of parents, gets internalised strongly into a value system. lt is our premise that 
this ideology is fairly widespread in Sri Lanka and education is an issue where mobilisation 
of public opinion is possible. 
Even at the end of eighties Education plays this role in our society and the demand for it 
is very high. However as we shall show later the capacity of education to fulfil these social 
demands is limited. ln certain branches of education like the tertiary education this limitation 
is fait much more. 
The incapacity of the education system to deliver educational demands is fait much more 
acutely among those social classes for whom education has been the key variable in their 
chances for social mobility and making a difference in their life chances from generation to 
generation. Among these classes education has actually fulfilled these aspirations in the past. 
These are also social classes who do have the capacity to benefit from expanding education. 
They do have in their command resources and influence which allow them to see their 
children through the educational ladder. 
The influence of these classes have been the major social force shaping the education 
system in the past as well. Therefore an analysis of the social impact of education become 
more meaningful if this differential impact of education in society is kept in mind. ln keeping 
with this perspective we could divide the population into the following three groups in terms 
of the opportunities for social mobility provided through education:-
(a) Those who have means of social mobility (inherited wealth, private capital, etc.,) other 
than education: this group would have access to education, but educational achievement 
would not be a deciding factor in their social mobility. 
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(b) Those for whom education and opportunities provided through is the crucial factor for 
social mobility. While they lack other avenues for mobility, their background provides a 
certain material base due to which they can get the best use of the opportunities provided 
by education. For this group education is the main fa et or that changes their lite situation 
from generation to generation. 
(c) Those who participate in education, without it affecting their chances for social mobility 
in any significant way. They form the large majority of the population. 
lt is our premise that in order to understand the socio-political forces that have shaped our 
educational system and the contradictions that prevails in society because of changes in 
educational policy, it is important to understand group (b) who are the 'new' beneficiaries 
from the expansion of the system under state patronage. They become 'new' beneficiaries 
due to expansion of education and it will provide them with additional opportunities to climb 
the social ladder and aspire to higher social levels. Those in group (b) already enjoy a certain 
socio- economic base because of which they can participate in the educational opportunities 
provided by the state and therefore benefit from it. They do have a certain standard of living 
which makes it possible for them to send their children through twelve years of schooling 
and push them to higher education. 
Many difficulties arise in exact characterisation of this group. The terms that are usually 
applied to identify them are 'intermediate classes' or 'petty bourgeosie'. Sometimes both 
these terms are qualified with the term 'rural'. 
These sections also demand an expanded role of state in education. Seing a middle layer 
and very often rural based they do not have independent means for establishing or 
maintaining schools on their own. Therefore they look towards the state as a means of 
providing resources for education as well as opening doors of privileged sectors in the 
education system. 
These 'intermediate classes' who benefit from the expansion of education are also a 
powerful political force. Many studies on political sociology has shown that people who are 
absolutely poor do not articulate themselves politically on their own. They are too involved 
with their day to day survival. lt is those who are just above them ('intermediate classes') 
that usually become politically more active against injustices in society. They have a higher 
sensitivity regarding their own status and power in society vis a vis those in the upper 
classes. They are able to articulate their grievances politically and also have in their 
command enough intellectuel and material resources to do so. 
ln Sri Lanka too these 'intermediate' classes have been extremely active in politics and has 
been in forefront of social change specially since mid finies. Politically this group is very 
articulate and actually forms a part of the class block that rules this country. ln addition 
nationalism and chauvinism has also been one of the potent political weapons of this class. 
Today it is a very useful slogan for these classes. 
Much of the contradictions generated by lack of opportunities in education or inability of the 
society to provide chances for social mobility aven if they get an education is fait by these 
'intermediate classes'. These contradictions form a basis of the acute social conflict that Sri 
Lanka is f seing today. 
The 1971 insurgency was the first serious attempt in post independent Sri Lanka at capture 
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of state power through a violent insurrection. lt was popularly termed as a 'youth 
insurrection'. ln the analysis of underlying factors of this political avent education and 
unemployment of the educated was given a high degree of importance. "The argument 
offered here was that a dramatic enlargement of educational opportunities, concentrated 
primarily within a single generation, produced soaring aspirations and expectations among 
the youth. The pace of the educational expansion, coupled with sluggish economic growth, 
lad to staggering levais of unemployment for educated youths and an abrupt shattering of 
the new expectations. lt may be inferred that the stifling of hopes and expectations 
contributed to a growth of disillusionment, alienation and sense of deprivation among youths, 
which in turn heightened the potential for political violence." (1 ). 
Although the growth of education, emergence of an educated youth without a prospect for 
employment was not considered as the only 'cause' of the insurgency, it was accorded a 
key position in the explanations of that avent. This was also reflected in soma of the 
measures undertaken by the government as a policy response to the 1971 insurrection. 
The political and social crisis faced by Sri Lanka today is much more complex than the 
insurgency of 1971 . There are several conflict processes that prevails within the society. 
The character and impact of the present conflict is much more extensive and violent. lt could 
threaten the very existence of Sri Lanka as a unitary state. There is the complex issue of 
ethnie conflict which cannot be reduced to pure economic terms as a major underlying 
reason for the present situation. This central issue was complicated because of a very high 
degree of violence in the political process, militarisation of the society and the involvement 
of a regional power. ln short today's conflict is not simply a result of actions of 'frustrated 
educated youth', whose social mobility and economic advancement has been hindered. 
However this does not mean that the 'old ' issues are not operative in the present context. 
The demand for education is still high because it is looked upon as a means of social 
mobility. The problem of educated unemployed is also a major issues in today's context as 
well. Similarly there are many difficulties because of the incapacity of the state to fulfil the 
educational demands arising from the society. These are felt much more by the 'intermediate 
classes'. We shall look into some of these aspects in detail when we consider the post'77 
development in education in Sri Lanka. 
ln the present context the social problems generated by the incapacity of education to act 
as a means of social mobility is complicated by the introduction of the ethnie factor. As we 
have already mentioned the ethnie conflict is an extremely complicated issue having several 
dimensions. However education has always been a major issue linked to it. The facilities 
provided for education for different ethnie groups; the medium of instruction in education; 
and the opportunities for higher education enjoyed by different ethnie groups have ail been 
controversial issues in the ethnie conflict. 
The issue of admission to the universities became a major controversial issue in the ethnie 
conflict in the seventies. This was sparked off by the notorious formulae for standardisation 
of marks which were introduced for university entrance. The initial outcome of these new 
admissions formulae was to limit the opportunities for Tamil medium students in faculties 
such as medicine, engineering and science which were in much demand (2). These were 
the avenues for social mobility in higher education and the attempts to manipulate 
opportunities in these streams on an ethnie basis created much controversy. This certainly 
played a crucial role in the growth of Tamil militancy in the seventies. 
Thus discussions on the impact of education in social mobility has two dimensions. On one 
hand we have the three different social groups identified above. Out thesis is the impact will 
differ among these three social groups. Secondly it is also necessary to analyse how this 
differential social impact operates in different ethnie formations. Both these aspects together 
will give us an idea of the influence of education as a means of social mobility. This is 
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crucial research question that has to tackled in the future in the area of sociology of 
education. 
Developments in Education since 1977 
The coming into power of UNP regime in July 1977 initiated an economic policy framework 
that resulted in the greater integration of the country's economy with the international 
capitalist system. This integration of Sri Lanka's economy into an international system has 
been taking place in most sectors of our economy. Today the influence of the international 
system is relevant to understand the production process aven in a remote village. ln other 
words the dynamics of the development process is increasingly determined by processes that 
operate internationally. This determination cornes not only because of greater intervention 
of bodies like IMF and World Bank in Sri Lanka's economic decisions, but also because 
international capitalism is an objective historical force that operates internationally and can 
be analysed only as an international system. What we are observing in this second hait of 
the twentieth century is the greater and greater influence of this international system in 
economies and societies not only of the third world countries, but also in the so called 
second world countries. 
These policies introduced since 1977 are promoted by what have corne to be known as 
monetarist theories in economic development and they have been strongly supported by 
international institutions like the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank (WB). 
Because of this soma authors have referred to these policies as "Monetarist/IMF/WB (MIW) 
type" (3). MIW-type policies can be summarised as economic liberalisation, export-lad growth 
and fiscal balance. 
"Great faith is placed on the market mechanism as a panacea for economic ailments, and 
government intervention in the economy is opposed in almost any form" (4). These policies 
have two aspects, viz: structural adjustment and liberalisation. Structural policies 
recommended are liberalisation of trade and financial dealings with the international system, 
development of the financial institutions and money markets and reducing the size and the 
economic role of the state. On the stabilisation sida recommandations are for the balancing 
of the budgets and maintaining a stable growth in money supply. (5) These 
recommandations are based on well known tenets of free market theories that emphasise 
market forces, comparative advantages, reliance on private capital (local or foreign), balanced 
budgets (cutting down of the government expenditure and welfare) and control of money 
supply. These changes in the direction of economic policy since 1977 are what characterise 
the main thrust in the development policy since then. 
ln contrast to post '77 policies, the previous phase can be characterised as a period when 
state regulated inward looking policies dominated. The policy prescription that emerged 
looked towards the state as the main angine of economic growth. Protected markets, price 
controls, restrictions on foreign exchange movements and quotas in production were the 
hallmarks of this period. Ali these amounted on the one hand to a greater dependence on 
state regulation and state involvement for economic development and greater protection of 
the economy from external factors. 
What is also important to note is the tact that state involvernent was also legitimised with 
a social justice argument. Intervention of the state in various spheres of the economy and 
society was to redress the injustice prevailing in society and soma aven characterised this 
transfer to state ownership within a capitalist framework as 'socialism'. State subsidies were 
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introduced into the social sector as well. This led to the development of the welfare policies 
that Sri Lanka is famous for. Despite this 'welfarist' orientation this pre'77 phase can be 
more correctly understood as a different phase of capitalism with a different set of policy 
orientations. 
Even before this 'new' post '77 phase of capitalist development was introduced into Sri 
Lanka the difficulties in fulfilling the aspirations of the population in relation to education 
started to show. Two most important manifestation of this were (a) lncreasing difficulties 
in maintaining resource allocation so as to continue the expanding role of state in education. 
(b) The presence of a dislocation between the increase in the number of those graduating 
from the system and the availability of jobs. While the first was questioning whether the 
state could continue to distribute educational facilities in the same way as before, the 
emergence of educated unemployed meant that the aspiration for mobility of those who 
succeeded and went through the system was not fulfilled. The popular demands for 
educational opportunities, democratisation of the educational structures and nationalist 
objectives within education were the forces shaping educational development in the past. 
But it was clear that from the seventies this was becoming more and more difficult within 
the present economic framework. The policy changes of post '77 period were initiated within 
this context. 
- Policy thrust in Education 
The thrusts in the educational policies since 1977 can be identified by the analysis of 
principle policy documents that emerged during this period. Of these documents the White 
Paper on Education and the Corporate Plan for the development of Higher Education are two 
important ones. Public lnvestment Plans presented every year covering investment patterns 
for the coming five years are the other sources of information, specially on the investment 
patterns in education. 
White Paper on Education (6) was a result of the deliberations of the Education Reforms 
Commission set up in 1981 . The findings of the Commission was presented as a White 
Paper for the purpose of public discussion. Although these discussions were inconclusive 
because of the controversies it generated, and the public had the impression that it was 
withdrawn and no special legislation on education was brought in, the thinking in the White 
Paper was the main guideline for educational policies in general education during this period. 
There is no doubt that the rising costs of education was a major concern of the White Paper 
on Education. The major strategy proposed for facing this problem in general education was 
linked to a regrouping of schools into so called 'clusters'. As the White Paper says, "ln 
general, schools within a defined geographic area will be grouped into a cluster for the 
purpose of better organisation, management and development. This will enable a more 
efficient utilisation of resources of both the state and the community. Thus the smallest unit 
for planning the development and organisation of the school system will henceforth be the 
school cluster"(7). Generally a cluster was expected to have about 3000 - 5000 students. 
Along with the 'breaking - up' of the centralised system into smaller units for administrative 
purposes, for organisation and for development, one notes in the White Paper the 
encouragement given to these units to be self reliant. Thus, "school clusters will be 
encouraged to move towards greater self-reliance so that they may shoulder heavier 
responsibilities and also be vested with greater authority with regard to the management of 
the cluster's activities. "(8) A similar idea of self-reliance was earlier put forward by the 
46 
establishment of what was called the 'school development societies' at each school levai. 
Now it is the school cluster unit that is expected to be self-reliant. lt is important to look 
at the trend towards the break-down of the school system into small units and the demand 
for their self- reliance, together. lt is by this two-pronged strategy that the White Paper was 
trying to face the question of the scarcity of resources available for education. 
The White Paper extended the idea of breaking the highly centralised educational structures 
in the area of educational administration as well. lt proposed setting up District Educational 
Development Committee in each administrative district which were to handle decentralised 
administration. Vary often these decentralisation attempts are also means of reducing the 
resource burden on the central budget by giving part of the responsibility for resources to 
the decentralised structures. 
The second strategy of meeting the rising costs in education was linked to the establishment 
of several terminal points in the general educational structure. Looking at education as a 
ladder with twelve consecutive years in school leading into university has been the dominant 
ideology in education. This is closely linked to the role played by education as a means of 
social mobility. ln reality, however, many do not complets this route. A large number drop 
out of the system half-way. Nevertheless, the expectations built on the education system 
in this manner are very strong. This not only exert tremendous pressures for the state to 
continue to expand education, but is also costly because many drop out of the system 
without achieving the intended goals. This has been identified as a major problem when it 
cornes to making education more cost effective and therefore it is linked to the overall 
question of the rising costs of education. 
A possible remedy for this is to allow students to stream out of the system at earlier stages 
and legitimise,, their departure from school with certificates or grades. Secondly there could 
be attempts to develop other branches of education so as to absorb some of the students. 
Soma of the proposais in the White Paper reflect such thinking. 
The structure of the education proposed by the White Paper provided several new stages 
for streaming out of students from the course of general education. According to the White 
Paper proposais, "at Grade 8 a local examination will be held to enable those who wish to 
leave school to obtain certificats. General education will terminate with the G.C.E. 
Examination at the end of Grade 11 . The last 2 grades in the school system will be 
accessible only to those with a strong academic aptitude and will prepare students for a 
University Entrance Examination which will replace the present G.C.E. (AL) Examination." 
(9) Thus the idea of limiting the numbers attempting to go into higher education was a core 
idea in the White Paper proposais. 
Finally White paper puts great emphasis on the development of middle levai education. White 
Paper incorporated special report on the development of middle level technical education. lt 
proposed for the first time state co-ordination of this sector of education under a Tertiary 
Education Commission. The main objective of this Commission was to develop professional 
courses at various levais, with emphasis being given to Science Technology and Commerce. 
The White Paper also gave a clear positive encouragement to private initiatives in education. 
This was in keeping with the general policies of the government encouraging the 
participation of the private sector. A private sector in education persisted aven in the period 
before 1977 when the expansion of the state in education was the norm. However since 
1977 there is positive encouragement given to the private sector. This change of attitude 
towards the participation of the private sector in education is a fundamental change in 
thinking from the pre '77 era. The establishment of the much talked-about private Medical 
Collage and the legislation enacted to give the private institutions the right to grant degrees 
are examples of this encouragement. The government also reinstated a practice that was 
discontinued with the take-over of 'assisted' schools in 1962 - that is, the decision to take 
back into state hands the payment of salaries of teachers in private schools. 
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Without a serious dismantling of the state education system, the government can, 
nevertheless attempt to ease its financial burden by passing on at least a certain part of the 
responsibility for the educational system on to the private sector. This would not have 
increased the financial burden on the state, but would be an indicator of the government's 
positive attitude to the private sector in other areas. 
ln the area of Higher Education the policy reforms began with the reorganisation of the 
University structure. Since 1977 the single university system that existed before was 
converted into a system of six autonomous universities. A University Grants Commission 
was established to determine the higher educational policies. The Corporate Plan drawn up 
by the University Grants Commission is a major document that reflects the policy emphasis 
for the post '77 period. 
The Corporate Plan concentrated on "the consolidation and development of existing 
universities and faculties. The number of new proposais have been minimised and have been 
concentrated in the areas of science, medicine, technology and computer science'. ( 10) ln 
the admission polices its main concern has been to balance the social demands for Arts 
education and manpower needs of the country. lt has tried to do this by a "modest increase 
in total entry, while decreasing the arts and increasing the science intake"(11) 
- Patterns of expenditure in education 
The Table 1 given below summarises soma of the main indicators on expenditure on General 
education. 
Table 1 
(in Rs. Total Exp. per A as a% Total exp. 
min.) Current Pupil of GNP as a% of 
Exp. (A) (8) govt. exp. 
1977 860.4 349 2.5 10.1 
1978 962.9 322 2.4 5.8 
1979 1098.6 350 2.2 5.8 
1980 1398.3 426 2.3 5.3 
1981 1621.0 481 2.0 6.4 
1982 2035.1 599 2.2 6.2 
1983 2360.9 682 2.1 6.6 
1984 2529.0 715 1.8 5.3 
1985 3270.5 898 2.2 6.1 
1986 2493.5 665 1.5 5.1 
1987 3414.9 891 2.0 6.0 
Source : Central Bank - Social & Economie Statistics 
Declining trends in the proportion of GNP spent on education started before 1977. By the 
beginning of the seventies Sri Lanka's expenditure on education has corne down from the 
5% GNP figure which had been highlighted very often. Between 1973 and 1974, there was 
a further drop of the expenditure from 3.4% of the GDP to 2.7%. Post 1977 saw further 
decrease in this indicator. ln the years 1978 to 1987 the expenditure on General Education 
1.5% to 2.4% G.N.P. 
The seventies also show a drop in the educational expenditure as a percentage of the total 
government expenditure. Educational expenditure which had been running constantly at 
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around 13 - 15% of total public expenditure up to 1972 declined to 10% by 1977. From 
1978 onwards there is a further decline. ln the years 1978 to 1987 this fluctuates between 
5.1 % and 6.6%. Therefore both these indicators show that the high level of educational 
expenditure that Sri Lanka was reputed for has coma to end by the beginning of the 
seventies. 
Table 2 
Par capita Expenditure on Education (At Constant prices) 
(in Rs.) Education Higher Education 
1970 
Recurrent 34.65 4.88 
Capital 1.86 1.02 
Total 36.51 5.9 
1977 
Recurrent 62.94 150.58 
Capital 7.20 17.50 
Total 70.14 168.08 
1983 
Recurrent 150.58 11.13 
Capital 17.50 16.00 
Total 168.08 27.13 
Source : Sri Lanka: the social impact of Economie policies during the last decade - UNICEF 
- Colombo - 1985 
Table 2 summarises the par capita expenditure in real terms both in General and Higher 
Education for 1977 to 1983 period. This data shows that in the case of general education 
par capita real expenditure declined slightly during this period. This has happened both for 
capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure. The main reason for this were the decisions 
taken to reverse soma of the changes brought about by the 1972 educational reforms. The 
lowering of the age of admission from 6 to 5 years increased the school population. This 
added " .... approximately 300,000 children to the school system. This together with the 
restoration of the 1 Oth year of the basic educational cycle and the G.C.E. Ordinary level and 
Advanced level examinations, increased total school enrolment by 27 par cent during 1978 
and 1979". (12) As a result of these changes "par student real expenditure tell from Rs.336 
in 1977 to Rs.273 in 1980 and Rs.260 in 1983. The percentage of the total recurrent 
expenditure going to teacher salaries also went up during this period from 90% in 1977 to 
95% in 1980 and 91 % in 1983 .. " .(13) 
"Much of the increase in expenditure on education since 1977 has been in the area of 
university education with recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure going up tan times 
during 1977 - 82. The real expenditure per student on formai tertiary education increased 
at the rate of 48 percent p.a. during this period in contrast to the decline of 16 par cent p.a. 
during 1972 - 77."(14) This increase in expenditure was largely due to increase in capital 
expenditure. "ln 1979 recurrent expenditure on university education was 62 par cent of the 
total expenditure. However in subsequent years capital expenditure increased to 59 percent 
of total expenditure in 1981 and 57 percent in 1982 with the inauguration of work on the 
new campuses at Ruhunu, Dumbara and Batticaloa and with major improvements being 
49 
effected in the infrastructure of university education in the country".( 15) 
ln Higher Education increased expenditure improved the real per capital expenditure by 24% 
between 1977 and 1983. (Table 2) lt also meant that Higher Education began to imrpove 
its share of the total education budget. "Higher education increased its share of the budget 
from 7% in 1977 to 16% in 1983". (16) Data for later years shows a further increase in 
the share Higher Education expenditure to about 23%. 
Despite these initial increases in expenditure in certain branches of education still a very 
large percentage of resources goes to keep the school system going, leaving very little for 
new additions. ln 1986 for example " approximately 80% of total expenditure in education 
was spent on recurrent expenditure and the balance 20% was allocated to the capital 
expenditure. "(17) This was similar to the proportions in 1985. 
Available data also shows the regional disparities in educational expenditure despite the 
slight increases in expenditure during the early period. Table 3 below shows a grouping of 
the educational districts on the basis of Recurrent expenditure per pupil in 1985. The 
average figure for Sri Lanka during this year was Rs.1042.6. lt varied form a low of 
Rs.625.0 for Vavuniya educational district to a high of Rs.1206.9 in Colombo. 
Educational districts by recurrent expenditure per pupil (1985) 
Rs.600 - 800 
Rs.800 - 1000 
Rs. 1 000 - 1 200 
> Rs.1200 
Nuwara Eliya, Tangalle, Jaffna/Killinochchi/Mullativu, Mannar, Vavuniya, 
Batticaloa, Kalmunai, Trincomalee, Moneragala 
Homagama, Matale, Galle, Nikaweratiya, Chilaw, Anuradhapura, 
Polonnaruwa, Bandarawela, Ratnapura, Ampara 
Gampaha, Minuwangoda, Kalutara, Kandy, Matara, Kurunegala, 
Kuliyapitiya, Kegalle 
Colombo 
Source: Compiled from " Sorne lndicators and Projections Relevant to First and Second Levie 
General Education" - Ministry of Education - December 1986 
Most of the available data shows that post 1977 period has not meant any significant 
dismantling of the education structure managed by the state. This is the impression given 
by soma of the critiques of the post '77 period when they talk of the 'destruction of the free 
education system'. On the other hand because of the favourable foreign aid situation that 
existed after 1977, the government has been able to carry out new investment programmes 
in order to improve infrastructure facilities of the school system. 
However the declining proportion of the government budget that education receives 
continued after 1977. At the same time the increased expenditure in education which we 
have noted does not mean that the education system has been able to meet all the demands 
on education. Many problem areas remain. We shall look at soma of the crucial problems in 
the sections that follow. 
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- Diversification of Education 
The period of the expansion of education in the sixties was buttressed by a strong ideology 
which saw education as a lad der leading to a university degree. This populist ideology 
wanted to see an education that will take the rural 'boy' to the university which will 
probably take him to a government job. Most of the expansion during this period took place 
in the area of liberal arts and humanities. Part of the reason for this was of course lack of 
facilities for any other education at the post secondary level, specially in rural areas. The 
other reason the desire for a 'degree' as major means of social mobility. 
However the pressures of the economic system which has been making itself fait gradually 
from the seventies, is moving the system away from this populist modal to one where the 
needs of the economy are taken into account. This means the system has to be reformed 
qualitatively in order to produce skills of a technical nature both at the middle and higher 
levels. 
Even at times when our economy was not expanding, there were difficulties in filling 
vacancies at the middle-level professional and craftsmen grades. With a certain expansion 
of the economy since 1977 in areas like construction, tourism, services and with such 
developments like opening up of employment avenues in the Middle East, the incentives for 
development of skills at middle level have grown. At the same time, there is a demand for 
this type of education coming from the students as well. Private sector also has been 
encouraged to play a role in this area. 
ln actual fact the need to improve middle level technical education was something that was 
recognised long before '77. The Gnanalingam report which formed a part of the White Paper 
is a repetition of what was said by a similar commission headed by the same person in the 
sixties. But the objective conditions related to the economy which is necessary to fulfil these 
needs had arisen only after the more systematic implementation of capitalist policies since 
'77. 
Since 1977, a certain expansion of this middle-level education has taken place; in order to 
get an overall picture, one has to add to the efforts of the government, those from the 
private sector, which has moved into areas such as commerce and management. What is 
interesting to speculate on is the feed-back that these will developments have on the 
attitudes towards education in general. The attitudes associated with the initial expansion 
of education, which were characterised by the yearning for a University degree, may be 
changing significantly. This is not only because of the difficulties encountered in obtaining 
employment, but also due to the new emphasis on technical education. 
The expansion of the middle level education since 1977 is summarised in Table 4 
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Table 4 












• excluding Jaffna, Kandy, Pathadumbara and Nuwara Eliya training collages 
Table 5 
Courses 1977 % 1986 % 
Higher National Diploma & 1963 20 3345 15.5 
Professional courses 
Diploma courses 1736 17.7 1040 4.8 
Certificate Courses 4121 41.9 10152 47.1 
Trade Courses 2010 20.4 1847 8.6 
Other 5178 24.0 
Total 9830 21562 
As shown by above data the intake of students into this sector in 1977 was 5755. This has 
increased to an average of 9300 in the years 1978 to 1980 and between 141 OO in the 
years 1981 to 1986. Table 5 also shows that there has been a diversification of the type 
of courses available. 
The expansion of the middle level education in the public sector took place through several 
bodies. These include Technical Institutes under the Ministry of Higher education, National 
Apprenticeship Board, Vocational Training Centres under Labour Ministry, and National Youth 
Services Council. These are the main state managed organisations where this education 
takes place and most of them expanded their programmes in various ways during the post 
'77 period. Most of these programmes were expanded with the help of foreign aid and this 
has been a major factor for this expansion. 
The development of a private sector in education since 1977 has been most prominent in 
this middle level of education dealing with various types of vocational and skills 
development. ln Sri Lanka there has always been a private sector in this area of education. 
What we have seen since 1977 is a vigorous growth of this sector. Although the debate on 
privatisation in education in Sri Lanka during the past decade has centred on the Private 
Medical College, due to the high visibility of this issue and the political clout of those 
affected by it, the real growth of the private sector has been in this middle level of 
education. 
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"Private initiatives account for 11 par cent of the intake for formai training but contribute 
much more significantly with places in industry for the apprenticeship programme and by 
way of short course. The intake into formai technical and vocational programmes increased 
by 85% in the public sector and four times in the private sector in the post 1977 
period ... n .( 18) 
The expansion of the middle level education is an attempt to shift away from dominance of 
liberal arts education at the tertiary level as the motivating force in education. The argument 
has been to develop professional and technical skills that the economy needs. Similar 
thinking has influenced the policy emphasis given in higher education. 
- Capacity and demand on the education system. 
Sri Lanka has the reputation of being a country that has expanded her secondary level of 
education so as to include more and more children of school going age within the system. 
The available data shows that this has expanded in recent times as well. ln other words 
more and more children who are of the school going age enter into the education system. 
Table 6 























Source : Central Bank - Economie and Social statistics 
Census data also shows that participation rates has shown remarkable improvements for 
different age groups. Participation of children of the 5 to 14 age group has improved 
significantly in recent times. 
Table 7 
Percentage attending School by Age group 
Age Group 
5 - 9 
10 - 14 











An indication of the same can be had by looking at the proportions who do not get into the 
schools. Here too there is a continuous improvement. 
Table 8 
School Avoidance Rates• 
Age Group 















• For the age group 5 - 13 'schools avoidance' includes those who have never been to 
school as well as those who have been to school but are not currently attending. For older 
age groups, this category includes only those who have never been to school. The minimum 
age of entry into school in 1973 was 6 years and in 1978/79 and 1981 /82 it was 5 years. 
Source : Sri Lanka: the social impact of Economie policies during the last decade - UNICEF 
- Colombo - 1985 
The next important aspect is the fate of those enter into education system. Not all those 
who enter are able to complets the entire open span of education. The completion of the 
primary cycle of education can be considered as a minimum goal in improving the access to 
education. This has been identified as a basic need by international agencies as well. Table 
9 below gives relevant data for Sri Lanka in relation to this indicator. 
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Table 9 
Number completing the primary cycle per 1000 in year 1 
District 1971 1982 
Am para 490 681 
Anurad ha pu ra 484 750 
Bandarawela 649 773 
Batticaloa 375 503 
Colombo 772 830 
Galle 579 806 
Gampaha 685 843 
Jaffna 692 801 
Kalutara 637 809 
Kandy 544 762 
Kegalla 614 774 
Kurunegala 512 795 
Mannar 479 694 
Mata le 468 745 
Matara 638 815 
Monaragala 447 764 
Mullativu 847 
Nuwara Eliya 514 457 
Polonnaruwa 563 670 
Puttalam 449 693 
Ratnapura 493 707 
Tangalla 524 765 
Trincomalee 452 635 
Vavuniya 512 678 
Sri Lanka 576 742 
Source : National Atlas - The National Atlas of Sri Lanka - Survey Department 1988 - P. 72 
The national average here shows an almost 30% increase during this period. Ali the districts 
show an improvement in this indicator, with a single exception. The exception is the Nuwara 
Eliya district, where the proportion completing the primary cycle has dropped from 1971 to 
1982. 
Sorne of the problems regarding the capacity of the education system to fulfil educational 
needs of the society can be understood by looking at data on the progress of a cohort that 
enters into grade 1 . Comparing the data given below with the progress of cohort that 




Progress of a cohort Age 5 in 1975 il 1969 
335000 100 100 
Entrants to schools 303000 90.5% 80% 
To govt. schools 290000 
To other schools 13000 
Not entering schools 32000 9.5% 20% 
No from cohort in gr.6 (1980) 239000 71.3% 44% 
No from cohort in gr.ix (1983) 189000 56.4% 
No from cohort in gr .x (1984) 168000 50.4% 
No qualifying to sit 'A' level 85000 25.4% 15% 
No with minimum marks to enter 28000 8.7% 
university 
No admitted to universities 5000 1.5% 0.1% 
Source: Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth - Sessional Paper No.1 - 1990 
This comparative data shows that there is a continuous improvement at the level of 
secondary education. If in the 1969 cohort almost 20% did not enter into schools at all, this 
proportion has been halved by the time 1975 cohort enters into schools. Similarly the 
proportions completing the primary cycle improves from 44% to 71 % for these two different 
cohorts. The percentages finishing ten years of schooling also improves from about 30% to 
50%, so does proportions qualifying to sit for A levels. 
The major incapacity of the education system still remains at the upper level. From the 
cohort in 1969 only about 0.1 % had chances to enter into higher education. This has 
improved marginally to 1.5% by the time of the 1975 cohort. 
Table 11 
Year Total Total % 
qualified admitted 
1975 15023 3942 26.2 
1976 19045 4150 21.8 
1977 27580 4996 18.1 
1978 26918 4959 18.4 
1979 29698 4857 16.4 
1980 41331 5004 12.1 
1981 32409 5318 16.4 
1986 24004 6208 25.9 
1987 31079 6143 19.8 
1988 34490 6463 18.7 
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"ln the period 1977 - 1986 the total enrolment in universities increased by 18. 7 per cent. 
However this increase has been concentrated in science-based disciplines, where intake has 
increased by 31 per cent and total enrolment by 30 per cent. ln contrast for Arts based 
subjects, intake has increased only by 3. 7 percent' .(19) Compared to the enormous demand 
for higher education these increases were very marginal. 
We can get a sense of the present situation in absolute numbers by looking at the figures 
given in the recently published Youth Commission Report(20). lt has looked at 1987 ,which 
was a year with no disruption in the examination process in recent times. This year 
"484,797 students sat the 'O' Level examination but only 95,416 (about 20%) qualified to 
continue their studies. 389 ,381 students all around 16 years of age were compelled to look 
for other avenues for self advancement." This gives the magnitude of those entering the 
labour market with at least ten years of schooling. 
"ln the same year, 112577 students sat the "A" Level examination, of which only 31,079 
qualified. Of these 6143 gained admission to the University ..... Hence in 1987 alone 106,434 
students who sat the 'A' Level turned away disappointed and frustrated at not been able to 
enter the University." ... Thus in 1987, a total of 495,815 students - nearly hait a million 
young people -(398,381 students at 'O' Level and 106,434 at 'A' Level) had to corne to 
terms with unfulfilled aspirations." (21) 
This lack of avenues of further education is not compensated at all by other available 
avenues. At the moment the Open University can take in a maximum of 9000 students and 
all the other government managed middle level institutes another 15000. Although there is 
a large number of other training programmes run by government managed institutions as well 
as by private organisations this does not meet the demand of the numbers finishing 
secondary level of education. This is a major issue that has undermined the role of education 
as a means of social mobility. 
Educational Profile of CP 
There is no doubt that Sri Lanka has achieved a considerable degree of success in providing 
educational facilities to a large section of her school going population. These achievements 
have been highlighted in many reports both here and abroad. However many problem areas 
remain. ln the sixties and seventies most critical evaluations of education focused on the 
quantitative aspects of the availability of schooling facilities. The thrust was to expand the 
facilities as much as possible and to overcome disparities at various levels. Lately questions 
related to the quality of education both in terms of internai efficiency of the education 
system and problems of standards have entered the discussion. Therefore the present debate 
on problems areas of education include almost all aspects of the education system. 
A recent survey (22) of the education system identified following areas of education as 
needing attention at the moment - "the non schooled children ; the early rejects of the 
school system; the physically and mentally handicapped; the quality, efficiency and relevance 
of primary education; the selection and screening mechanisms of the education system; the 
small category 3 schools with only 1-2 teachers; the 5-6 most disadvantaged districts in 
the country; the Estate sector; planning, management and co- ordination in education; 
linkage between education and world of work; needs and supply of manpower; and the role 
of research of educational policy." As already mentioned this list covers almost every aspect 
of education and is a good guide in identification issues in educational policy. 
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These problems faced by the education system in general is reflected at the Provincial level 
as well. This section will try to focus on the provincial level. Information for this profile of 
education is primarily based on the analysis of educational statistics published by the 
Education Department in 1981 and 1985. Other sources such has the data from the 
Consumer Finance Surveys of the Central Bank and data of the Labour Force and 
Socio-Economic surveys of the Department of Census and Statistics are used as 
supplementary sources of information.(23) 
The available data allows us to present the profile taking into account two variables 
operative in the Province. One is the district variations in educational standards and secondly 
the characteristics of education provided for different ethnie groups in the Province. 
Sometimes the data for both these variables overlap, sometimes they do not. 
First we look at the district level indicators for education in the Central Province. Available 
statistical indicators are considered under several issues which seem to reflect the main 
problem areas in education. 
Table 12 
Provision of educational facilities in Central Province 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya S.L. 
No of schools per 30 sq.km. >9 3-5 7-9 
No of schools per 10,000 pop. 4-6 6-8 6-8 
State schools by type of school 
% % % 
1 A & B - A/L Science 35 (5.2) 9 (2.9) 9 (2.0) 430 
1 C - A/L Arts or Commerce 117 (17.3) 57 (16.0) 40 (8.7) 1292 
2 - Up to Grade 1 0 269 (39.9) 110 (35.8) 119 (25.9) 3914 
3 - Up to Grade 5 254 (37.6) 139 (45.3) 292 (63.5) 3998 
Total 675 307 460 9634 
% of one teacher schools 7.0 4.2 18.7 5.4 
Pupil/Teacher ratio by type 
of school (1983) 
1 A & B 22.65 23.05 23.41 25.17 
1C 22.91 22.60 25.58 24.58 
2 24.78 22.70 27.63 27.23 
3 27.44 26.67 52.13 31.72 
Latrine facilities needed 3.85 36.00 63.29 24.31 
as a % of requirements 
Generally all the indicators show that Kandy is the district with the best provision of 
educational facilities. Specially when it cornes to schools that can give an education up to 
grade 12 Kandy is far ahead of other two districts. On the other hand Kandy has the lowest 
indicator in terms of schools per 10,000 population. This shows that due to higher 
population concentration in this district there is greater pressure on the schools. 
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Nuwara Eliya districts stands out as the worst off in terms of provision of facilities. Although 
this district seem to be provided with schools at a level comparable to the other two 
districts, the bulk of the schools in Nuwara Eliya provide an education only up to grade 5. 
Almost 64% of the schools in Nuwara Eliya district provide an education only up to that 
level. This is much higher than the national average of 41.5% for schools in this category. 
The pupil teacher ratio in these schools is 52.13, which is the lowest for the province. ln 
addition 18. 7% of schools in Nuwara Eliya are what are called one-teacher schools.(7 .0% 
Kandy; 4.2% Matale; 5.4% for Sri Lanka). 
Even in other facilities schools of this district are poorly provided. For example, in 1985 
schools of this district did not have almost two third of the latrine facilities required for the 
schools. This low standard of educational facilities is due to the long term neglect of schools 
in the astate sector, which also means neglect of the education of lndian Tamils who live 
in astates. We shall coma back to this issue later in this section. 
The level of provision of educational facilities in the Matale district is quite comparable to 
that of Kandy with soma exceptions. lt seems to fall behind Kandy in facilities such as 
latrines, playgrounds, etc .. However the other indicators of Matale like No of schools per 30 
sq.km.,No of schools per 10,000 population and percentage of one teacher schools are quite 
comparable to those of Kandy. 
Table 13 
School enrolment and progress of cohorts in Central Province 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya S.L. 
Age specific enrolment ratio 
(1983) 
5 - 14 84.9 85.1 68.6 85.0 
14 - 19 39.0 33.2 20.1 33.4 
No of pupils from a cohort 
of 1000 that would graduate 
from the primary cycle ( 1983) 750 783 662 800 
Pupil years required to produce 
a single graduats completing 
the primary cycle (1983) 8.30 8.25 9.56 7.94 
% of students at A.L.Science 
obtaining 200 or more marks 
( 1981-1983) 6.17 4.12 1.05 6.65 
These are indicators which shows to what extent children of school going age population 
in these areas actually go to school and their chances of getting through the school system. 
lndicators also cover the chances students have at higher levels of education such the senior 
secondary level. 
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Again these indicators show the lower standards of the Nuwara Eliya district. lts enrolment 
rate for the 5-14 is only 68.6%. This by the way is the lowest enrolment ratio for the whole 
island. Similarly only 662 of every 1000 children of Nuwara Eliya district complets the 
primary cycle and on an average it takes 9.56 pupil years to produce a single graduats from 
the primary cycle. 
The other indicators for student performance are for higher levels of education like the 
Advance Level examination. At this level too the performance of Nuwara Eliya district is very 
low. Only 1.05% of students sitting A.L. in Science gets more than 200 marks, which is 
the bare minimum for a pass grade in four subjects at the A levels. 
ln the cases of Kandy and Matale the differences in these indicators are much more 
pronounced at the higher levels of education. At the lower levels of the educational cycle 
such as the enrolment ratio for the 5-14 age group ,the number of students graduating from 
the primary cycle for every 1000 pupils and the number of pupil years required for a single 
primary school graduats, the indicators for Matale district are slightly better off than those 
for Kandy. But at the higher levels of schooling like the A.L. the disparity between these two 
districts corne to light. ln Kandy more students qualify for Advance level education than in 
Matale. This is true for all streams of learning such as science, arts or commerce and for all 
media of instruction. This fact is also borne out by comparison with national averages. At 
higher levels of secondary education the performance of Matale is much lower than the 
national average. 
Expenditure in Education 
Table 14 
Kandy Mata le N'Eliya S.L. 
Recurrent expenditure per 
pupil (Rs.) 1129.2 927.2 694.6 1042.6 
% of recurrent exp. extended 3.5 1.7 1.8 2.9 
by community ( 1984) 
ln our education system the bulk of the expenditure in education falls to the category of 
recurrent expenditure. From this almost 80% is taken up by salary payments to teachers. 
Therefore disparities in recurrent expenditure largely reflect the different levels of expenditure 
for teachers. 
There are glaring disparities in the indicators for recurrent expenditure per pupil in the three 
districts. At one end Kandy district has an expenditure of Rs.1129.20 per pupil and at the 
other end Nuwara Eliya has an expenditure of Rs. 694.60 per pupil - 38% lower than the 
expenditure level for Kandy. Like some of the other indicators Nuwara Eliya has the lowest 
figure for the entire island. Matale district shows a per pupil expenditure of Rs.927 .20. lt 
is important to note that expenditure levels in Matale and Nuwara Eliya are below the 
national average as well. 
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A very small percentage of this recurrent expenditure is borne by the support of the 
community. Kandy with the community providing 3.5% of the recurrent expenditure shows 
the highest levels of community contribution. 
Educational Levais of the population 
Table 15 




Educational Levels ( 1981) 
Below Gr.5 
Passed grades 5,6,7 
Passed grades 8 or 9 
Passed O/L in 6 subjects 
Passed A/L in 3 subjects 
Passed degree or graduats 
Unspecified 






































This data is from the national census. lt measures the comparative educational standards 
achieved by the entire population of the district. Literacy rates, Educational levels and 
Educational Index are soma of the indicators used for this measurement. As it can be 
expected Nuwara Eliya district is the worst off in all these indicators. Even in a very basic 
indicator like literacy rates the situation in the Nuwara Eliya district is severe. For exemple 
only 69. 7% of females in the Nuwara Eliya district are literate. There is as much 33.6% of 
the district population who haven't attended schools at all and another 41.2% have passed 
grades 5,6, and 7. There is a significant drop from this point onwards and only 3.3% of the 
population have passed 0/L in 6 subjects. 
The difference between Kandy and Matale districts in these indicators coma out at the higher 
levels of education, while at the lower levels the situation in the two districts are similar. 
While 7 .5% and 1.5% of the Kandy district population have an educational level up to 'O" 
Level and 'A' Level respectively, the corresponding figures for Matale district are 5.0% and 
0.9%. 
The comparison of these district level data given above allows us to place the three districts 
in a continuum as far as the education situation is concerned. At one end is the Kandy 
district with relatively better school facilities. However in this district there can be great 
disparities and due to the larger demand for education there is greater pressure on the 
schools. ln all other indicators either for provision of educational facilities or the educational 
levels of the population Kandy is the best district. 
At the other end is the Nuwara Eliya district. lt is the district with low educational levels and 
a low educational index. lt has the lowest levels of recurrent expenditure per pupil. lts school 
system has a large proportion of schools giving an education only up to 5th grade. 18. 7% 
of the schools in the district are one teacher schools. Only 662 of 1 OO students complets 
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the primary cycle. This district has lowest enrolment ratios in both age groups of 5 - 14 and 
14 - 19. ln schools having grades only up to year 5 this district has an appalling 
pupil/teacher ratio of 52.13. 
Matale district can be placed in between Kandy and Nuwara Eliya in this continuum of 
educational situation. lt is at the upper end of the educational ladder that the difference 
between Kandy and Matale becomes significant. Facilities available for Advance level 
education, performance of students at this level, etc in Matale are below national averages 
as well. At the same time these are points in the system which are crucial for social 
mobility. 
Education and ethnicity in the Central Province 
Sri Lanka over the years has actually developed a state owned school system which is 
ethnically segregated. ln many multiethnic societies education is very often ethnically 
segregated. Historically the Sri Lankan education system was segregated according to 
religious denominations. However the take over of denominational schools in 1962 brought 
bulk of the education system under state control. The prevalence of a unified state 
ownership and management in education has motivated us to look at the education in 
monolithic terms. However within the state managed education system of today there are 
two parallel systems identified by the medium of instructions. ln actual tact there is a third 
system because some schools are specially designated as Muslim schools. 
According to school census in 1981 only 138 (1.5%) schools out of 6927 in the whole 
island had more than one medium of instruction. Over the years the number of schools 
having students studying in more than one medium has decreased. ln other words now we 
have an ethnically segregated school system, although bulk of the schools are managed by 
the state. This has far reaching implications for educational policy. However it has not been 
given much attention in our discussions. 
Table 16 gives some of the basic data for the ethnically segregated school system of Central 
Province in 1981. From a total of 1436 schools in the district, 58 (4%) have more than one 
medium. Bulk of the Tamil medium schools are concentrated in the Nuwara Eliya district. 
These are mainly schools in the estate sector. 
Table 16 
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than one medium 









































There is very little data available to show the ethnie based disparities in the school system 


















The school system catering to the Sinhala students has a Pupil/Teacher ratio that is 
comparable to national standards. The situation for the other two ethnie groups varies 
enormously. 
Table 18 
School candidates qualifying 
at the 1 st attempt to G.C.E. 
(A.L.) on the basis of G.C.E. 
(0.L.) results in Science 
Sinhala Medium 
Tamil Medium 


















At the upper levels of education there are glaring differences in the performance in the 
Sinhala and Tamil media. Again the worst performance is in the Tamil medium of the Nuwara 
Eliya district. Here only 2.8% of the students qualify to follow advance level studies at the 
first attempt. The performance in the Sinhala medium is also not that impressive - only 5.4% 
qualifying in the Science stream. Generally these figures shown for the upper level of 
education demonstrates the poor quality of our education as we go up the educational 
ladder. 
The other data that throws some light on differences in educational standards between 
ethnie groups in the province is available from sectoral data. Table 18 summarises this data. 
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Table 19 
Literacy Rates 1985/1986 
Sri Lanka Urban Rural Estate 
Male 88.6 92.4 88.5 74.5 
Fe male 80.0 86.1 80.7 45.9 
Total 84.2 89.1 84.6 59.4 
Source : Labour Force and Socio-Economic Survey 1985/86 - Department of Census and 
Statistics - Preliminary Report 1987 
School Avoidance Rate 198111982 
5 - 9 
10 - 13 

















Source: Central Bank Consumer Finance Survey 1981 /82 - 1984 
Educational Levels 
Estate Sector 1963 1973 1978/79 
No Schooling (llliterate) 57.1 51.7 43.5 
No Schooling (Literate) 1.1 
Primary 34.9 40.6 47.4 
Secondary 7.2 6.2 6.7 





Non-Estate Sector 1963 1973 1978/79 
No Schooling (llliterate) 34.0 30.1 21.5 
No Schooling (Literate) 1.0 
Primary 39.8 37.6 38.1 
Secondary 21.2 25.8 28.3 
Passed (0/L)/(SSC) 3.8 5.7 9.5 
Passed (A.L.)/(HSC) 0.4 1.0 
Undergraduate 0.1 
Passed Degree 1.2 0.2 0.4 
Other 0.2 0.1 


















As it had been shown in so many other studies this data also confirms the tact that astate 
sector lags far behind the other two sectors when it cornes to educational standards. Given 
the tact that bulk of the population in the astate sector belong to the lndian Tamil ethnie 
group this data also reflects low standards of education among the lndian Tamil population. 
Emergence of Provincial Councils and the education system 
Devolution of powers in education 
The establishment of Provincial Councils and devolution of a certain degree of power to them 
is a significant development in Sri Lankan history. The major social force that brought this 
about was the ethnie conflict which dominated the politics of Sri Lanka during the past 
decade. 
The Provincial Council system is by far the most significant attempt at restructuring the 
highly centralised state of Sri Lanka. This is bound to have its impact in many areas 
including education. One of the salient features of educational development in Sri Lanka is 
its centralising tendencies over the years. This coincided with the expansion of the role of 
the state in education. This process created in the seventies a highly centralised system 
which managed at one time almost one third of the entire workforce in the public sector. 
The pressures to decentralise education was apparent aven before the Provincial Council 
system came into being. As we have already mentioned the White Paper on education 
proposed by the post '77 UNP regime had proposais for decentralisation. 
The Provincial Council system has a far reaching impact on the organisational structures of 
the education system. The system of devolution in the sphere of education as envisaged by 
the 13th Amendment has the following salient features; 
- Centre retains National Policy in all subjects which will include education as well. Centre 
also seem to determine soma of the basic elements of the education system such as 
minimum age of and other criteria for school admission, determination of the structure of 
education, curriculum (with some provisions for the PCs to change) and conducting of public 
examinations. 
- ln the area of planning, devolved Educational Functions include, 
a. Preparation of plans (educational development plan and annual implementation plan) 
b. lmplementation of the Annual Educational Development Plan. 
However since the National Policy on all subjects and planning are part of the reserved list, 
it is not clear what is meant by planning in the area of education that has been devolved to 
the Provinces. Rest of the provisions seem to indicate what is given to the Provincial 
Councils is implementation planning primarily in the area of infrastructure development. This 
means at the level of the general educational policy centre maintains the control. The PCs 
can prepare their own educational development plans and plans for implementation. These 
development plans seem to include mostly development of infrastructure and facilities of the 
school system. 
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- The PCs have powers to manage the bulk of the secondary education excluding what are 
called national schools. These are mainly well equipped 'alite' schools in urban centres. ln 
March 1989 the Secretary to the Ministry of Education announced that around 20 schools 
have been designated as national schools and other 'special schools'(24). Centre also retains 
power to appoint Principals to Grade 1 schools which have provisions for Advanced level 
studies. ln other words Centre will appoint principals of grade 1 schools in addition to 
managing the national schools. 
- PCs have the power of recruitment, and transfer, etc of the teachers in secondary 
education other than national schools. Training will coma under the centrally managed 
National lnstitute of Education. ln the case of transfers too teachers have the right to appeal 
to the Public Service Commission. ln other words PCs will manage the bulk of the workforce 
in the education system, with certain provisions been given for the centre to intervene. 
- The content of the education and the examination system is largely under the control of 
the centre. PCs will hold soma of the local level examinations and it can bring about certain 
changes in primary curriculum and in specified subjects of secondary curriculum with the 
approval of the Centre. Production and distribution of text books by the provinces has to be 
approved by the Centre. 
- PCs have been given control over other aspects of education like pre-school education, 
informai education, provision of library facilities, sports facilities, etc. 
- At the level of the middle and higher levels centre retains the control of the existing 
system. But an interesting aspect of the amendment is that PCs have been given concurrent 
powers in the establishment of new Universities and in "The establishment of degree 
awarding institutions under the Universities (Amendment) Act no. 7 of 1985, and other 
institutions for tertiary, technical and post-school education and training"(25). The latter Act 
was mainly meant to allow the establishment privately managed degree awarding institutions 
at the post secondary level. 
The pattern of devolution in the sphere of education visualised in the 13th Amendment can 
be generalised as follows: ln this package the most important policy issues on the education 
like the structure, content, examinations, teacher training, are still under the control of the 
central authorities. Although there are provisions for the provinces to tamper with these it 
is severely limited. Centre has also kept within itself the 'alite' schools after designating 
them as national schools and the appointment of the heads of grade 1 schools. lt is 
interesting to note how the centre has always been trying to keep these schools out of the 
reforms that the other schools are subjected to. Another example of this same practise was 
keeping them out of the clustering exercise carried out under the White paper on education. 
The Provinces are given the management of the personnel and material inputs into the rest 
of the secondary educational structures. Although in terms of hierarchical importance these 
parts of the education system might not be that important, provinces nevertheless gets a 
large chunk of the education system and they will have to manage it. ln tact in terms of 
persons and material the provinces will now have the bulk of the education system to 
manage. 
Of course the provinces will have to be provided with the resources to manage these 
educational structures. However it is much more easy now to put pressures on the Provinces 
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to become more self reliant in order to reduce the burden on the centre for resources for 
education. The handing over of the management of the bulk of the secondary structures to 
the provinces can be a more efficient method of doing it. Therefore devolution of power in 
the sphere of education coïncides with the strategies to manage education more efficiently. 
ln addition to transferring the management of persons and material of the bulk of the 
secondary education system to the Provincial Councils it is the handing over of powers to 
recruit and transfer teachers amounts to an important political concession given to the 
provinces within this context of limited powers enjoyed by them. Recruitment of teachers 
has been an important area of political patronage hitherto controlled by the politicians 
powerful at the level of the centre. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms this has been 
a source of power to the politicians. Therefore conceding this to the politicians at the 
provincial level has been an important development. However it is precisely in this area there 
have been complains about non compliance by the centre. ln a recent document put out by 
the EPRLF lad Provincial Government of the North/East province it was noted that, "Provision 
of facilities, to all state schools, supervision and management of pre-schools transfer and 
disciplinary control of educational personnel have been devolved. However the recruitment 
of teachers continued to be done by the Central Government, in spite of protests by the 
Provincial Government"(26). ln this document which was produce months after the 
inauguration of the PC system this by far is the most significant complain of the provincial 
administration in the area of education. 
The other interesting feature of this package of devolution in the sphere of education is the 
concurrent power in the post- secondary education mentioned above. lt is obviously an 
incentive for the Provincial authorities to encourage private initiatives in education at this 
level. lt is also significant that this is the only power given to the Provincial authorities at 
the tertiary level of education. This too is in keeping with the post'77 policies of encouraging 
private initiatives in education and this is an attempt to get the co-operation of provincial 
authorities in this task. 
Resource allocation in education in Provincial Councils 
During the initial years of its operation Provincial Councils was provided with certain block 
grants mainly to cover their recurrent costs of the devolved functions that have been handed 
over to them. A more comprehensive scheme of funding the Provincial Councils is being 
planned from 1992 onwards. The arrangement for 1991 will be a transitional one keeping 
in mind the envisaged scheme in 1992. 
Table 19 
Provisional estimates of Recurrent Expenditure of Provincial Councils on Devolved Functions 
for 1990* 
(As.Min. at 1989 prices) 
WP CP SP NEP NWP NCP UVA SAB Ali 
Total for 
devolved functions 2827 1634 1623 1896 1541 821 740 1307 12388 
Education 1340 680 700 580 620 280 280 480 4960 
% for Education 47.4 41.6 43.1 30.6 40.2 34.1 37.8 36.7 40.0 
Source : M. Ranjit P. Salgado - Report on Fiscal aspects of the Public Sector restructuring 
project (Financial devolution to the provinces) - September 1989 
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The estimates for recurrent expenditure of the Provincial Councils clearly shows the funds 
needed just to maintain the existing facilities for education will form on an average 40% of 
the recurrent expenditure of Provincial Councils. This is the largest item of expenditure for 
all Provincial Councils. ln the case of the Central Province PC 41.6% of the current 
expenditure is needed for education. The bulk of this educational expenditure will be pay 
teachers salaries. 
The present estimates also show that devolved revenues allocated to the Provincial Councils 
will cover roughly about 15% of the current expenditure. ln other words the PCs will depend 
to a large extent on various forms of grants provided by the Centre for new developments 
and expansion of activities in all areas. 
The envisaged scheme for allocating finances for the Provincial Councils is partly 
needs-oriented and partly principles based. lt consists of several components, 
- Needs oriented aspect is reflected in block grants .This is determined after assessing the 
current expenditure and the devolved revenues of the PCs. The block grant will be calculated 
as the amount needed to fill the gap between a pre-determined proportion of the recurrent 
expenditure of the Province and the devolved revenue collected by that Province. For 
1992-1994 period the pre-determined proportion is 80%. 
- Principles based aspect is reflected in criteria based grants.(available for PCs on programs 
and projects of their own choosing) Criteria -based grants are determined by computing an 
indices which reflects the 'level of development' of each Province. Lower the level of 
development, higher will be the amount allocated through the criteria-based grant. The 
following are the criteria and the weightage for each criteria in determining criteria-based 
grants 
1 . Per capita income 
2. Difference between per capita 
of each province and highest per 
capita income among Provinces 
3. Poverty Index 
4. Employment 
Rate of Unemployment 
5. Education 
Index of Educational Status 
6. Health and Nutrition(Composite Index) 
Infant mortality per 1000 live births 
Expenditure on food per capita per mnth. 
Total 
7. Economie and Social Infrastructure 
(Composite Index) 
No. of persans per hospital bed 
No. of classrooms per 1000 in age group 
5-19 
Households lacking toilet facilities 
Households without electricity 















- A third aspect is the matching grants which hopes to encourage revenue generation at the 
Provincial Council level. "The matching grants will be computed on the basis of formulas that 
relate to the excess of the actual collection of devolved revenues by a Provincial Council in 
a given over the the "benchmark revenue" representing the revenue generated from the 
devolved sources in a base year (or base period). For the application of the formulas, the 
Provinces will be placed in different categories, taking into account of their existing revenue 
base, revenue potential, tax incidence and tax administration capacity. The formulas will 
incorporate a slab system with a view to further reducing the possibility that the Provinces 
with the larger revenue bases would receive disproportionately larger matching grants." (27) 
According to this scheme matching grants are expected to become a significant element in 
the total availability of funds. The devolved revenues should increase markedly. The total 
availability of criteria based should also increase. Thus the block grants are likely to become 
less important as a source of funds. lt may be envisaged that by 1994, the end of the first 
three-year period of the full operation of the scheme, criteria- based, matching grants and 
devolved revenues would account for the major part of the available funding. 
On the basis of the above following Central Province will be allocated the following, if the 
devolved revenues show a 100% increase from the 1987 levels and Rs.1000 million is 
available to be distributes as criteria-based grants. 
Block Grant - Rs.1023.2 Min. - 63% 
Matching Grants - Rs.178 Min. - 11 % 
Criteria-base Grants - Rs.138 Min. - 8.5% 
Devolved revenues - Rs. 284 Min. -17. 5 % 
This shows aven with such a revenue effort, the block grants would still form the bulk of 
the resources available for the Province. ln other words the Province will have to depend on 
the funds allocated from the Centre in the foreseeable future. 
Conclusions 
ln the concluding and final section of this paper we hope to focus our attention on soma of 
the policy issues that are emerging in the area of education keeping in mind the analysis 
provided in the previous sections of this study. We shall begin this with a recapitulation of 
the conclusions presented in the earlier parts of the study. 
The backdrop to the specific analysis on education was provided by part 1 of the study 
which looked at the emerging tendencies in the ethno-political processes in the Central 
Province. Here we began by emphasising the importance of politics in understanding and 
identifying tasks that face provincial councils in the Central Province. Our objective was to 
show the inadequacy of pure administrative approaches in policy analysis. Pure 
administrative approaches treat the institutions set up to devolve power in a political 
vacuum. On the other hand recognition of politics, specially ethno-politics, is extremely 
important aven to understand the policy problems faced by PCs. 
Our study of the emerging socio-economic and political tendencies showed the volatility of 
the Central Province. This area is ethnically segregated. Population movements and growth 
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of violence in politics has pushed the lndian Tamil minority to look for 'safe areas' in this 
province. However there is a tremendous pressure on land arising both from socio-economic 
processes within the peasant sector and also fuelled by nationalist ideologies that hope to 
redress historical grievances of the Kandyan Sinhalese. These tendencies make the situation 
of lndian Tamil minority very vulnerable and brings in a sense of insecurity to this population. 
ln other words the province has all the elements that can contribute to an ethnie conflict. 
These processes are also taking place in a context of a general ethnie conflict in the country 
which is influencing the growing ethnie identity of the lndian Tamil population. 
Finally the first part of the study looked at the significance of the emergence of a system 
of Provincial Councils in this context of growing polarisation between ethnie groups. This 
newly formed structure certainly provides a new channel for political representation. 
Specially in the case if lndian Tamil population PCs has become an important institution for 
political expression. However our analysis pointed out two important factors that limit the 
effectiveness of provincial councils as a mechanism of providing answers to problems faced 
by the region. ln the first place the powers given to the PCs is such that it is extremely 
difficult to imagine that it can play any significant role in addressing socio-economic 
problems that underlie tensions in the area. Secondly, in the case of lndian Tamil 
ethno-social group the capacity of their representatives to bring about changes that can 
improve the living conditions of their own constituency is extremely limited. This arises 
because of the fact that plantations where bulk of the lndian Tamils live and work are 
entirely controlled by the centre. This limits the capacity of lndian Tamil members of the 
Provincial Councils of using the Councils to address the grievances of their own 
constituency. 
The second part of the study undertook to look at problems in education and educational 
policies keeping in mind the conflict laden context of this area as described in the first part 
of the study. Education too has been an issue that has contributed to the social as well as 
ethnie conflict of Sri Lanka. Therefore the minimum objective of policy analysis in education 
is to identify policy prescriptions that at least will not further aggravate the situation. 
Identifications of such pitfalls is a first step towards formulations of policies that can 
improve the situation in a positive direction in the future. 
Analysis in the part 2 of the study first looked at factors which make education a politically 
sensitive issue. We linked this with its role as a means of social mobility. This in turn is a 
result of the pattern of socio-economic development of Sri Lanka which does not create 
other means of social mobility for a large section of the population. ln this analysis of social 
mobility provided by education we have focused our attention on what we have termed as 
'intermediate classes'. As we have explained, this particular section of our society have 
benefited from the expansion of educational facilities through the state intervention in 
education. Therefore the ability or inability of education to provide social mobility directly 
affects their interests. ln that section we also have emphasised the importance and the 
significant influence of this class in politics of Sri Lanka. 
Social contradictions generated by development policies followed since 1977 should be 
understood within this important role played by 'intermediate classes' in social and political 
processes of Sri Lanka. Broadly speaking this group formed the social force that changed the 
course of Sri Lanka's post independent history in 50s and the 60s. They were and are the 
ardent supporters of the pre '77 package of development policies within a capitalist 
framework. These policies helped in their competition with the 'alite' and in their upward 
social mobility. Policies followed during this period narrowed the gap between the 'elite' and 
'intermediate classes'. The bulk of the population of Sri Lanka falls to the third category of 
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'the rest'. ln rural areas marginal farmers and landless labourers fall into this category. 
So-called welfare policies in the past have not changed their condition much. However they 
form the social base of mass politics. 
Generally the post-'77 policies had led to a greater social polarisation. The specific character 
of this polarisation can differ from area to area. But we would argue that the more 
important factor to understand social contradictions generated by these policies is the 
growth of the gap between the 'intermediate classes' and the 'alite'. The polarisation 
between the 'alite' and the 'intermediate classes' has taken place in a context of certain 
economic growth as well. This growth has given a relative sense of prosperity and has 
expanded the availability of consumer goods and enhanced consumeristic ideology. ln such 
a context the perception of relative depravity fait by the 'intermediate classes' is aggravated 
and this accentuates the already existing social contradictions. 
However the present stage of the capitalist development in this country does require the 
general direction of policy changes initiated since 1977 . This is dictated by the logic of 
capitalism. Capitalism does not provide any other alternative path. This also means that 
contradictions between the 'alite' and the 'intermediate classes' which characterise this 
phase of capitalist growth is also an inevitable outcome of this development process. 
Capitalism will have to overcome this contradiction in order to move further in its path of 
development. 
Manifestation of this conflict between the 'alite' and 'intermediate classes' is apparent in 
various spheres in Sri Lanka including education. As a result of the decisive role that 
education has played in the social mobility of the 'intermediate classes,' changes in 
educational policies contribute very much to contradictions between 'alite' and the 
'intermediate classes'. From our discussion of the educational policies followed since 1977 
we can identify several developments which have actually gone against the interests of the 
'intermediate classes'. These are, 
(a) The incapacity of the system to provide adequate resources to meet the educational 
demands through the state system. The amount of resources spent on education has 
declined relative to the demand. 
(b) Stagnation of opportunities provided at the post secondary level of education for the 
large numbers streaming out of the secondary education. This reduces the role of education 
as a means of social mobility. 
(c) Ali these amounts to a reduction of the role that the Central government played in 
providing educational opportunities. Similar interpretations can be given to the devolutionary 
exercise in education, through which central government will reduce its role. 'lntermediate 
classes' could interpret this as an example of state abdicating its role of providing 
opportunities through education for their social mobility. 
(d) Encouragement given to the private sector in education. This gives more opportunities 
to the 'alite'. lt also reduces the relative weight that state had in education. 
Ali these are significant policy shifts in education during the post '77 period. Basically these 
changes amount to a reduction of the role played by state in education and encouragement 
of private initiatives. This is a change from the prevailing pattern and it could go against the 
interests of the 'intermediate classes'. At the same time the limitations of resources available 
for education seem to be such that these tendencies will dominate education in the near 
future. ln class terms it will mean the capacity for education to be a means of social mobility 
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in the same manner as in the past will be difficult. ln social terms it will amount to an 
accentuation of the conflict between, 'alite' and 'intermediate classes' in the educational 
sphere. Thus the major question for educational policy today is how to devise an education 
system that fulfils needs of capitalism today, while managing the social conflicts generated 
by this class contradiction. 
ln understanding these contradictions it is necessary to take into account the qualitative 
aspects of these policy changes in addition to the extent to which they have become 
prevalent in society. For example it is true that the growth of a private sector in education 
has been very slow and still the private initiatives account for relatively small proportion of 
educational facilities. However the social contradictions generated by it far exceeds the 
extent of the phenomena because of the social class affected by it. This is supplemented 
by the tact that attempts at privatisation is directed at the tertiary levai of"'education which 
is crucial for social mobility. This perhaps explains the extent to which the Private Medical 
Collage issue got politicised. The establishment of the Private Medical Collage was a step 
that severely threatened the foothold that 'intermediate classes' have obtained in a 
prestigious and lucrative area of higher education due to their political power in the past. 
Therefore the attempts by the government to reverse this by allowing privatisation in this 
sector met with great resistance. Although the political mobilisation on this issue was 
spearheaded by the radical J.V.P., there is no doubt that the issue did have wide support 
in the society. Soma of the opposition came within the governing party as well. 
There is the possibility of similar tendencies in the sphere of middle levai education. As 
shown by our earlier discussion this is an area where there is much emphasis given now and 
also a sector of education where private initiatives can expand. lt is also a sector where a 
large proportions of students who cannot enter higher education will have hopes on. 
Therefore if the access to this sector gets determined by monetary resources that the 
students can command it can become a major point of controversy in the future. Such a 
possibility exists if the private sector begins to play a significant role in middle levai of 
education. 
The other conflict that education policy making has to face is the ethnie conflict. As we 
have discussed access to educational opportunities, specially at the level of higher education 
was a major issue in the aggravation of the ethnie conflict. ln addition, it also has a 
relevance in the area of identity formation of different ethnie groups. ln the segregated 
educational system of Sri Lanka schools are considered as important vehicles for fostering 
of ethnie or religious identities of the younger generation. Therefore ethnie groups are 
sensitive about changes in the educational system that has a relevance for identity 
formation. 
lt is within such a context that one has to look at the policy options available in education. 
Confining specifically to the Central Province we have seen how the education system of 
this province is ethnically segregated. There are Sinhala schools, Tamil schools and Muslim 
schools. At the same time there is a significant disparity in the facilities available and 
standard of education among the ethnie groups. The relative low standards shown by lndian 
Tamil population in education has been shown over and over again by many studies. Data 
collected in this paper also has confirmed this. Therefore there is a strong argument for 
provision of more funds to the schools attended by this population. Bulk of these schools 
are now going to be managed by the Provincial Councils. 
On the other hand there is also inter-district disparity in educational facilities with Kandy 
district emerging as the better off district. Even within a district disparities are very high. 
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This tendency becomes more pronounced at the higher levels of secondary education. A 
child in Kandy district for exemple has more chances of succeeding at the Advance level 
than a child in Matale district. With PCs managing the provision of facilities to the bulk of 
schools, there is the likelihood that disparities between so called national schools which are 
managed by the Centre and other schools in the province will be further aggravated. 
Thus resource allocation in education in the Central Province has to be delicately managed 
keeping in mind both ethnie disparities as well as social disparities in the province. ln a 
highly volatile area like the central province and in a politically sensitive subject like 
education it is extremely important that this balance is maintained. Sorne of the specific 
policy prescription that can be advocated in this context are as follows; 
- Province can develop a special project for the upliftment of astate schools and relatively 
worst off grade 2 and 3 schools. This could be a priority for the Provincial Councils and 
undertaken in such a way that a careful ethnie balance is maintained. Such a project will 
have as its principle aim the improvement of infrastructure facilities and quality of teaching 
in worst off schools attended by all ethnie groups. 
- ln tackling the problem of social disparities attention should be focused on senior secondary 
level of education. Basically children from different social and ethnie backgrounds, who 
qualify in their 'O' levels to follow the 'A' levels, should have adequate facilities to continue 
their studies. This means educational facilities in Matale and Nuwara Eliya districts at this 
level should be given more attention and resources. 
- National schools of the Province managed by the Centre should have objectives far beyond 
catering to a privileged minority. The very tact the y are controlled from the centre can place 
them in a privileged position and widen the disparity between them and other schools. ln 
contrast to this their facilities should be open to children coming from other schools of the 
province at least at the higher levels. 
- National schools also should be places where special efforts are made to cross the ethnie 
barriers at school level. This will be the task of the Centre that will manage them. Since the 
Centre will not have the burden of managing all other schools at the secondary level it will 
be able to devote much more attention to this all important task. 
- Continuation of a segregated education system in a multiethnic province like the Central 
Province has far reaching consequences. ln the allocation of resources for education in this 
Province special material incentives should be given to schools that can develop programmes 
to cross ethnie barriers. This should be a special concern in planning education in the 
province in general. 
These are soma of the policy prescription that emerge from this study. They follow directly 
from the processes and tendencies mapped out in this study. If adequate attention is given 
to such policies keeping in mind the overall context mapped out in this study, soma steps 
can be taken in a positive direction in order to improve the ethnie and social relations in the 
area. 
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